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ABSTRACT 
The path to Chechen autonomy has been tumultuous.  Over the past 200 years, internal 
and external forces have played significant roles in shaping the territory and identity of 
the Chechen nation. Fierce resistance by Chechens has led Russian officials to label the 
region’s inhabitants as criminals.  Chechen criminality was also affected by punishments 
for this resistance.  Chechen resistance eventually let to the mass criminalization of the 
entire Chechen ethnicity.   
Mass criminalization exposed the Chechens to a wider Russian criminal world. 
Through illegal activities, Chechen criminals amassed significant resources.  As the 
Soviet Union fell, Chechen organized crime groups were poised to support the bid for 
national independence led by former Soviet General Djohar Dudayev.   
This thesis contends that bottom-up and top-down forces were critical in forming 
a perception of Chechen criminality.  The perception of criminality and its attendant 
punishments supported the rise of actual criminality, in a time where crime made possible 
the amassing of significant amounts of wealth and power.  It was wealth and power that 
Dudayev’s fledgling government needed, Chechen organized crime groups would 
provide but at a cost.  While providing material support to Dudayev organized crime 
elements infiltrated government positions to further their own interests. 
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Throughout history, criminals have played important roles in the formation of 
nation-states.  In emerging states, bandits have allowed a central authority to exert 
influence that exceeded its capabilities.  As the central authority’s power grew, fringe 
elements, like bandits and other non-conformists, were gradually brought under firmer 
control.  Elements that resisted the new authority’s control were re-labeled criminals and 
subjected to harsher treatment.1  Criminals that were capable of greater organization 
stood a better chance of avoiding punishment and integrating into the new social 
construct largely unchanged. 
Organized crime has historically both aided and stymied the formation of a central 
state.  Afghanistan, Columbia, and Montenegro serve as examples of locations where 
criminal organizations affected attempts to expand government control.  In each example 
organized crime has insinuated itself into the government.  Afghanistan is the most recent 
example. In assessing the current Afghan security environment, one cannot separate 
government officials, insurgent groups, organized criminals and the population.  Each of 
the elements has over time become increasingly tied to the government, providing 
services (revenue, security, money laundering) in exchange for political power and 
protection.2  Colombia provides another example of the nexus of criminal organizations 
and established government structures.  From the 1970s onward, the Colombian 
government provided varying degrees of political protection and positions in the 
government in exchange for economic and military assistance from the narco-traffickers.3 
Montenegro provides yet another perspective on the criminal-state nexus. In response to 
increasingly stiff economic restrictions from Serbia, Montenegrin leader Milo 
                                                 
1 Eric Hobsbawn, Bandits (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981) and John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A 
History of the Sicilian Mafia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) provide both a theoretical and 
practical basis for expanding state power through interaction with fringe elements. 
2 Matt DuPee, “The Narcotics Emirate of Afghanistan: Examining Armed Polities and Their Roles in 
Illicit Drug Production and Conflict in Afghanistan 1980–2010” (MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010), 103. 
3 Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 102–103. 
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Djukanovic facilitated the activities of an international cigarette trafficking network.  The 
revenues garnered from the taxation of transiting cigarettes provided Djukanovic with 
much of the operating funds to run the country.4  Each of these countries continues to 
cause varying degrees of trouble to regional and international communities, largely as a 
result of the criminal-state connection.  With weak police and legal traditions, neither 
Chechnya nor Russia has escaped this phenomenon.     
Trends in state formation, particularly consolidated democracies, have progressed 
in a manner that reduces the visibility of organized crime in legitimate government 
activities.  Domestic and foreign policies of consolidated democracies, while not immune 
to the influences of organized crime, generally aim to further national interests, not the 
interests of individuals.  Organized crime, however, tends to be less concerned with the 
survival of the state and more interested in the advancement of the organization economic 
or security interests.  No modern state is completely devoid of the influence of organized 
crime, but those with weak institutions and high levels of corruption are most at risk.  In 
all governments, a symbiotic relationship with organized crime exists, however its 
intensity varies significantly.  Afghanistan, Colombia, and Montenegro provide ready 
examples of such a symbiosis.  The symbiosis can take many forms, criminal elements 
can provide sources of revenue for political figures as in Montenegro, or they can provide 
political power as in Afghanistan, or they can augment governmental instruments of force 
as in Colombia.  In some instances, the crime-state relationship results in a net positive, 
as with Montenegro.  However, danger emerges when legitimate state structures are 
usurped by criminal elements and national interests are redefined often to the detriment 
of national stability.  Afghanistan, Colombia, and Chechnya provide instances where 
criminalized state structures have undermined regional stability.   
A. HYPOTHESIS 
The path towards an independent Chechen republic has been tumultuous and 
largely unfulfilled.  Over the past 200 years, internal and external forces have combined 
                                                 
4 Misha Glenny, McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld (New York, Vintage 
Books, 2009), 21–37. 
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to play significant roles in shaping a Chechen identity and shared nationality.  From the 
onset of imperial Russian expansion into the Caucasus, Chechens have been subjected to 
a series of converging factors that have contributed to the eventual establishment of 
robust organized crime elements.  Chechens have attempted several bottom-up efforts to 
develop a national identity.  Concurrently with these efforts, Russian and then Soviet 
governments attempted to impose artificial territorial and political structures, producing 
an opposing set of forces.  Soviet experiments in nation building built upon imperial 
policies, further pushing the Chechen society farther towards criminality.5   
Criminality, or the perception thereof, linked both processes.  More significant 
than mere criminality is the involvement of Chechens within the wider Russian organized 
crime structure.  With the relaxing of Soviet control in the late 1980s, Chechen organized 
crime elements blossomed into an entity with the necessary resources to support a viable 
independence movement.  During the initial bid for independence, Chechen criminal 
elements provided the coordination and logistics structures needed by the emerging 
Chechen national leadership.  As the independence movement grew the relationship 
became increasingly intertwined to the point where drawing a distinct line between 
national entities and organized criminals became impossible.  
Neither the notorious Chechen ‘Mafia’ nor the nascent Chechen state emerged in 
the late twentieth century free from Russian and Soviet influences.   The transition from 
the “egalitarian” society characteristic of eighteenth century Chechnya to an ethnic 
nation-state is directly related to Russo-Chechen interactions.  The extensive interactions 
produced a combination of bottom-up and top-down forces that resulted in a criminalized 
population, a strong national identity, and a disputed ethnic homeland.  All three factors 
provided a foundation that would set the conditions for a merger between powerful 
Chechen criminal elements and a Chechen independence movement.  
In articulating the confluence of Chechen crime elements and a national 
leadership, three elements bear consideration: the development of the Chechen Mafia, the 
genesis of Chechen national identity and struggle for a de jure independent Chechen 
                                                 
5 Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 20,186–191. 
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state.  Throughout the history, these three elements have been shaped and re-shaped by 
both sides of the Russo-Chechen relationship.  As such, each side bears a proportional 
share of the responsibility for the region’s current security state. 
B. PROBLEMS  
Because of the secretive natures of organized crime and Chechen society an 
extensive body of literature relating to this topic is unavailable.  The growth of Russian 
organized crime came into popular consciousness during the 1990s, but the chaotic 
environment of post-Soviet Russia did not lend itself to deep analytical studies.  
Reporters, not academics, produced most of the works relating to the subject, and they 
tended to more focus on the “Russian” variants of organized crime.   
First hand accounts of the organization and functioning of Russian, much less 
Chechen, organized crime is lacking.  Successful criminals outside of the former Soviet 
Union are generally loath to write memoirs.  Organized crime groups influenced by the 
secretive “thief’s world” are even less inclined to autobiographies; this is compounded 
when the criminals are Chechen.  Statistical data is similarly difficult to find and when 
found its accuracy and completeness is often called into question.  Crime data is 
generally drawn from police reports and the connection between law enforcement 
organizations and criminals in Russia and Chechnya tends to place such figures in doubt.  
In light of the opaque nature of the subject, it was necessary to approach the subject from 
a different angle, by looking for motivation, capability and opportunity to explain the 
perceived state of Chechnya today.  
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Events that occurred during the early stages of the Russo-Chechen relationship set 
in motion a pattern of action and re-action that resonates today.  Imperial Russian 
perceptions and policies toward the borderlands were adopted and modified by the Soviet 
leaders those policies largely remain in effect.  Attempting to isolate the interaction of 
organized crime elements and the national movement in Chechnya to the last twenty 
years would likely miss many of the more important causal mechanisms.  
 5 
The analysis will follow three main trends: the development of the Chechen 
homeland, the Chechen identity and Chechen involvement in organized crime.  Since all 
three aspects have been affected by the relationship with Russia the analysis will 
necessarily include salient aspects of the Russian experience.  Of specific interest will be 
the factors of the Muscovite/Russian expansion into steppe.  During the Muscovite 
expansion, patterns of imperial rule were developed that contributed to the unique 
character of the Russo-Chechen relationship.  Aside from a foray into the formation of 
the Russian Empire, the majority of the analysis will be concerned with the Russo-
Chechen relationship beginning in the late eighteenth century.  
The nature of organized crime tends to be secretive even in the most open of 
societies.  This secretive nature generally precludes the conduct of detailed quantitative 
studies.  The size and intent of organized crime elements remains unclear even to its 
criminal participants.  Law enforcement statistics provide an equally murky picture of the 
expanse of organized crime.  In many case throughout the West, law enforcement 
statistics are biased, some times intentionally at other time unintentionally.  Soviet and 
post-Soviet organized crime is doubly difficult, as law enforcement is a secretive 
organization attempting to thrive in an equally secretive and conspiratorial society.  For 
the purpose of this thesis, extensive use of English language secondary sources will be 
employed.  The limitation to English language sources is directly related to the inability 
of the author to function in Russian.   
Sources will be drawn primarily from scholarly texts, popular media and news 
sources, and, when appropriate and available, statistics will be employed.  Although these 
statistics generated from law enforcement agencies reflect priorities and biases of the 
issuing agency and their government.  English language newspaper and internet sources 
will be utilized to characterize the extent of the criminal/state connection.  Again, owing 
to the closed nature of Soviet/Russian society media and internet sources will tend to 
focus on developments since 1990.  For popular Russian perceptions of crime in 
Chechnya prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, literary sources will be utilized.  Russian 
authors from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn have described the rich character of the Chechens 
that will add to the overall understanding of the three themes.  When taken in totality, the 
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available sources will provide sufficient clarity to discern motivations and opportunities 




II. THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINALITY: THE AMORPHOUS 
CHECHEN STATE 
Throughout history, the Chechen lands have been profoundly affected by 
extended interaction with Moscow and St Petersburg.  It is through this turbulent 
interaction that the various forms of Chechen government acquired a criminal flavor.  
The process was not quick nor was it only imposed from above. It occurred over several 
hundred years, and was influenced from afar.  At the center of the interaction is the 
conflict between a flexible grassroots supra-tribal structure and a more static one imposed 
from a distance.  The tension between both trends generated political friction, which 
frequently erupted in violence.  Violence and resistance further established a scenario 
where tribal and supra-tribal structures that resisted Russian and Soviet control were 
deemed, by default criminal.  In this way, organic Chechen government structures 
assumed a decidedly criminal nature, one that would eventually lead to a merger with 
powerful Chechen organized crime elements.  
Before a more detailed discussion of the way government formation influenced 
the development of a criminal Chechen government, a few words on the concept of a 
state are warranted.  Despite efforts by Chechen figures over the previous two centuries, a 
formal state along Westphalian lines has never been achieved.  At best, the various 
organic attempts to this end have resulted in forms of a proto-state with the façade of 
stability.  Enduring institutions of state have never been solidified; instead anything 
above the tribal level has been achieved through charismatic leaders.  The structures of 
government present in the modern incarnation of Chechnya are borrowed from the 
Soviet/Russian experience.  Over the years, perceptions of sovereignty have been 
reinforced by an unwillingness or inability of an external power, specifically Russia, to 
exercise full control over the region. 
To understand the effects of the Russo-Chechen relationship it is necessary to 
look at the origins and development of the Russian Empire.  Russia’s origins affected the 
manner by which it expanded and the governed the empire.  Russian experiences were 
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transferred to the Soviets, and meshed with Leninist interpretations of Marxism.  
Methods of consolidation and rule led to Chechen resistance and subsequent 
criminalization. 
Tension between Russians and Chechens were effected not only by the presence 
of external and internal forces, but also by the character of the forces.   Religion played a 
role in defining the character of the Russo-Chechen relationship, and thereby its tension.  
It was not merely the differences between Orthodox Russians and an Islamic Chechens, 
but also the concern posed by two powerful Islamic empires to the south.  Russian 
concerns for a secure border to the south affected the form of their interaction with the 
Chechens further coloring the nature of the relationship.   
The Chechen adoption of Islam and their traditional forms of governance and 
customs added to the perception of criminality.  Both Islam and a secular tribal structure 
were not compatible with the patterns of Russian and Soviet empire building resulting in 
a rebellious southern border province.  The cumulative result set in motion a process that 
would produce a Chechen state linked at nearly every level with criminals.   
A. TRENDS FROM EARLY RUSSIAN HISTORY 
Details of the exact origin of Muscovy are still under debate.  For our discussion, 
Muscovy’s exact origins are not directly relevant to Russian and Soviet policies in 
Caucasus. However, several inherited characteristics have indirectly affected subsequent 
policies toward the empire’s periphery.  The nature of pre-Muscovite society, the 
adoption of Orthodoxy, prolonged exposure to Mongol practices and the constant concern 
for security were persistent factors of Muscovy and its successors.  These factors shaped 
the necessity for expansion, the method of expansion as well as the aims and means of 
controlling conquered lands.  All of these factors increased tension in the Russo-Chechen 
relation producing resistance and then criminality. 
The earliest precursors of Muscovy were multi-ethnic traders who expanded from 
the Baltic Sea toward and down the Volga basin.  The traders originated from a variety of 
northeastern Europe peoples, Jewish, Frisians and Saxon-German, between the seventh 
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and tenth century.6  A series of semi-independent trading settlements sprung up to 
capitalize on the existing slave trade.7  Each trading post employed locals, Varangars, as 
guards, mercenaries, or shippers.  At times, the Varangars seized control of the trade 
franchises and expanded the commercial interaction with communities deeper into the 
steppe.8  In order to establish and further the commercial potential of a Volga trade route 
these merchants would have had to possess some degree of multi-linguistic capabilities, 
for it could not be accomplished by force alone.9  The emphasis on utility over ethnicity 
would change over time, but the practice of co-opting useful elements of society would 
remain a feature throughout the Muscovite expansion into the steppe. 
Roughly concurrent with the growth of the Varanger expansion along the Volga 
basin was the rise of Eastern Slavic tribes.  While the Varanger expansion was 
characterized by its adaptive commercial nature Eastern Slavic expansion was influenced 
by regional powers.  The rise and fall of regional powers left a vacuum that Eastern 
Slavic tribes readily filled.10  Like the Varangian to their northeast, the Slavs 
incorporated minor neighboring powers through co-option or force while assuaging the 
fears of major regional powers.  The savvy growth east eventually culminated in a merger 
with the Varangian commercial societies.  By the tenth century, there was the “beginning 
of the cultural consolidation of the Rus’ and an attempt at their nationalization,” into a 
Kievan/Rus community.11  
Along with a growing position of power, the Kievan/Rus adoption of Orthodox 
Christianity would be a factor in the eventual character of the Russian Empire.  The 
adoption of Eastern Orthodoxy provided several benefits to a growing Kievan/Rus state.  
It did not pose a threat to the Byzantine Empire to the south, thereby allowing Kievan 
                                                 
6 Omeljan Pritsak, “The Origins of Rus,” Russian Review 36 (1977): 259. 
7 Omeljan Pritsak, “The Origins of Rus,” 264. 
8 Omeljan Pritsak, “The Origins of Rus,” 261. 
9 Omeljan Pritsak, “The Origins of Rus,” 256.  Omeljan Pritsak notes the Varanger (Viking) were 
comprised of a mixture of local ethnicities working as guards, shippers, and mercenaries.  They had no 
common ethnicity, the primary commonality being the possession of some skill necessary for the 
facilitation of a growing regional commercial trade. 
10 Omeljan Pritsak, “The Origins of Rus,” 269. 
11 Omeljan Pritsak, “The Origins of Rus,” 271. 
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expansion.12  Orthodoxy was a complete package; there was no need for local religious 
leaders to develop a complex system of dogma or rites.  While not possessing a 
missionary nature, such as Islam or Catholicism, it did prove to be an effective means of 
uniting Slavic and non-Slavic elements of the growing empire.13   
The arrival of the Mongols was the next significant event in the development of 
Muscovy.  There remains a diverging range of opinions concerning the influence the 
Mongol invasion had upon Muscovite domestic and foreign politics.  While the extent 
and method Mongol practices were transferred to Muscovite leaders remains contentious, 
all generally agree there were transfers.  Administrative structure and practices, economic 
processes, military tactics and weapons were all significant in the rise and later expansion 
of the Muscovite state.14  Muscovy’s adoption of portions of the Kipchaq Khanate did 
provide them with a distinct advantage over other Slavic communities.  The 
administrative structures and practices adopted by Muscovy facilitated the integration of 
groups previously under the control of the Khanate.15  The fiscal and political savvy of 
leaders such as Ivan Kalita (1329–1339) put Muscovy on the path to regional power.  
While the expansion of Muscovy into the steppe was far from bloodless it was 
accomplished in large part through co-option.   
Muscovy received an additional byproduct of extended contact with the Kipchaq 
Khanate and growth into the steppe, a near obsessive concern with frontier security. 
Some scholars such as Joseph Wieczynski have attempted to paint early Russia as a 
                                                 
12 W. Bruce Lincoln, Between Heaven and Hell: The Story of a Thousand Years of Artistic Life in 
Russia. (NY: Penguin, 1999), 17–26. 
13 Omeljan Pritsak, “The Origins of Rus,” 270–272. 
14 For a more extensive discussion of the influence of the Qipchaq Khanate (aka Golden Horde) refer 
to the works of Donald Ostrowski.  Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross Cultural 
Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Donald 
Ostrowski, “Muscovite Adaptation of Steppe Political Institutions: A Reply to Halperin’s Objections” 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 1:2 (2000): 267–304; Donald Ostrowski, “Mongol 
Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions” Slavic Review 29:4 (1990): 525–542. The works of Charles 
Halperin provide an additional perspective to this argument specifically: Charles Halperin, Russia and the 
Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History (Bloomington, IL: Indiana University 
Press, 1985); Charles Halperin, “Muscovite Political Institutions in the 14th Century” Kritika: Explorations 
in Russian and Eurasian History 1:2 (2000): 237–257.   
15 Donald Ostrowski, “The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions,” Slavic Review 49 
(1990): 541. 
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frontier society similar to the American west; arguing that Kievan Russia could have 
provided a “safety valve” for Europe, in much the same way that the westward expansion 
did for America. While there may be some degree of validity to these arguments what is 
not sufficiently addressed are the perceptions of existential threats posed by the frontier.  
The Muscovite state of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth century looked to the 
south and did not see a means to relieve social pressures.  Instead, leaders in Moscow 
looked south and saw danger in many forms.   The south represented a financial threat as 
it provided an escape path for the lower levels of society, primarily serfs.  The southern 
frontier also presented an external threat.16   
The further south Muscovy expanded the more they came in contact with alien 
cultures.  These cultures frustrated the historic pattern of expansion employed by 
Moscow.  Efforts to subjugate the Caucasus by Russians exemplify the difficulties 
Moscow experienced in interacting with wholly a different people. 
B. EXPANSION, SECURITY AND THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN 
RUSSIA  
For Muscovy, the southern frontiers did not so much represent a social safety 
valve as a growing security threat.  As the Kipchaq Khanate began to unravel, several 
elements presented a new security threat. Of particular importance were the Khanates of 
Kazan and Astrakhan.  The Muscovite conquest of both of these khanates in the mid-
sixteenth century represented the first in a series of offensive campaigns undertaken for 
ostensibly defensive purposes, breaking from previous Mongol or Muscovite practices.17  
Of particular importance were the efforts to secure the loyalty of former elites, with 
grants of land and equal status to Muscovite elites in exchange for military service. 
Moscow tended to view such an arrangement as permanent and immutable, while the 
 
 
                                                 
16 Joseph L Wieczynski, “The Frontier in Early Russian History,” Russian Review 31 (1972): 112. 
17 Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multi-ethnic History, (London, UK: Pearson Education 
Limited, 2001), 21.  
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steppe elites saw it in a more transitory fashion.18  These practices would prove relatively 
successful in integrating steppe societies, but were largely unworkable with the mountain 
tribes of Chechnya.  
Muscovite policies, of imperial expansion, were largely developed through 
interaction with the steppe societies during and immediately following the fall of the 
Kipchaq Khanate.  Muscovy’s policies consisted of flexible application of military and 
diplomatic pressure, coupled with the retention and integration of local cultural and 
political structures.  By the time the Russians came into sustained contact with the 
Chechen tribes, they had been practicing imperial politics successfully for several 
hundred years.  Imperial practices were not uniformly applied instead they were adapted 
to the peculiarities of the local situation.  During the eighteenth century, practices began 
to be biased towards the use of military force.19 
The establishment of an ever-expanding series of frontier forts characterized 
Muscovite expansion.  This system of fortresses was justified for two reasons, the 
necessity for a rapid military response to local resistance, and as a defense against 
external threats.  In the late sixteenth century, external threats remained a valid concern in 
the form of Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire.20  As the capacity for Moscow to 
exert military force expanded the perception of its appropriateness did as well.  
Early Muscovite efforts to control the Kazan populace were heavy handed, 
tending to rely upon military might and terror.  Interestingly enough the terror employed 
during Ivan IV’s foray into Kazan would be repeated later in Russian history, 
specifically, executions and deportation of elites, forced religious conversion, and 
directed migration to change the local demographics.  Understandably, these policies 
resulted in resistance by locals spurring a change in tactics to a more flexible approach.  
The modified policies focused upon finding and co-opting local elites who were 
                                                 
18 Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire, 23. 
19 Michael Khordarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 
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perceived as being loyal to Moscow.  Additionally, there was a heavy emphasis upon 
preserving local administrative structures, customs and practices with the express purpose 
of maintaining the status quo while supporting Moscow’s legitimacy.21  Chechen tribes 
would prove problematic, as there was no organic supra-tribal structure to subordinate, 
and when one did emerge, it did so as a reaction against Russia. 
Islam proved to be an obstacle to complete integration of conquered peoples.  
Forced conversion to Christianity resumed in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century further inflaming ethnic relations.22  It was likely demographic and military 
factors that forestalled significant rebellions during this time.  Russian treatment of the 
peoples in its conquered lands would be a factor fresh in the minds of the North Caucasus 
tribes, especially the Chechens, even though many of the repressive efforts were reversed 
under Catherine the Great.   
Revolts of the seventeenth century, underscored the continued security concerns 
throughout “integrated” lands, a situation, which would continue through the 
Europeanization efforts of Peter the Great, and more significantly, spur on Russian 
military efforts in the South.  Moscow’s efforts throughout the steppe, both punitive and 
conciliatory, were made possible by an extended period of interaction between groups.  
All the entities had a common frame of reference for their relationships, although the 
various sides may have perceived it differently.  This common basis allowed the 
establishment of an imperfect equilibrium on the steppe.  However, the common 
historical basis that allowed the successful integration of steppe societies was not present 
in the North Caucasus.  The lack of compatible structures did not stop the expanding 
Russian empire from attempting to apply lessons of the steppe, to the control of the 
mountains. 
                                                 
21 Andreas Kappeler expands upon the details of Muscovite conquest and control of Kazan in the 
chapter “Gathering the Lands of the Golden Horde”; Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire (London: 
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22 Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire, 32. 
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C. STATE AND NATION BUILDING IN THE COMPLEX LANDSCAPE OF 
THE CAUCASUS 
Tensions between Russia and the two regional powers, Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire over control over the Caucasus and Black Sea eventually led to armed conflict.23  
As a result of direct conflict with Iran and an expanding security arrangement with 
Georgian leaders, Russia gained a military foothold in the southern half of the Caucasus 
range.  Pavel Potemkin’s efforts to secure the Russian military position in Georgia rested 
upon maintaining a secure ground line of communications.  The ground line of 
communication would become the Georgian Military Highway, and remain a key aspect 
of Russia’s southern security structure.  Securing the Georgian Military Highway meant 
controlling the terrain to the east and west of the route and that meant bringing the 
mountain tribes to heel.  Mountain fighting is extremely difficult even in modern times, 
but extended and exposed supply lines and a lack of both strategic and tactical mobility 
characteristic of eighteenth and nineteenth century warfare made fighting in the Caucasus 
particularly fraught with danger.  It was this attempt to securing the route from 
Vladikavkaz to Tiflis that brought Russians into constant contact with Chechens.24 
From the perspective of the European observer, Russian expansion into the 
Southern Caucasus smacked of colonialism.  Russian leaders took a different stance 
regarding their conquest of the Caucasus as an expansion of Russia proper not the 
establishment of a colonial network.25  Concurrent with the conquest of the southern 
slope of the Caucasus was an evolving concept of imperial citizenship.26  Muslim Azeri 
and Christian Georgians were integrated into Greater Russia with relative 
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ease.  They possessed a readily identifiable national identity as well as having 
hierarchical national structures; both elements proved conducive to Russian integration 
methods.  
From its early inception, the occupation of the Caucasus was one of the most 
complex undertakings of the Russian empire.  The complexity arose from the sheer 
number of ethnicities and religions concurrently absorbed into the empire, exceeding 
those of the previous two centuries.27 
Of primary concern to Russian leaders, was the integrity and safety of the 
Georgian Military Highway; development of a state among the tribes was ancillary.  In 
the early stages of interaction Russian military leaders and viceroys tended to apply 
artificial social structures upon the mountain tribes, assuming that there must be some 
degree of centralization.  As a result of their assumptions, the Russian attempted to 
identify and co-opt a series of charismatic local leaders under the belief, that each would 
be able to compel the remaining tribes into accepting Russian dominance.28  The tactic 
was fundamentally flawed, there was no hierarchical political structure, and no one leader 
could force another’s compliance.   
Russian assumptions regarding the homogeneity of the mountain tribes do have a 
fundamental basis beyond the Russian desire for simplicity.  Many of the mountain tribes 
shared “lifestyle, dress, spiritual beliefs and folk customs.”29  The outward appearance of 
commonality and the similarity of their homelands, likely led to an assumption of 
uniformity that was not actually present.  While the rugged terrain appeared to isolate 
communities, there was some degree of interaction and exchange, but the result was far 
from establishing a supra-tribal political structure.30 
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Johann Anton Guldenstadt, a Baltic German naturalist, conducted an extensive 
survey of the Caucasian populations.  During the 1770s, he endeavored to describe and 
categorize the peoples in the region that would become Chechnya.  Interestingly he was 
afforded little actual time in Chechen villages, because of a tenuous security situation 
arising from, “…the enmity of the Chechens toward Russia.”31  Guldenstadt was able to 
characterize the typical social structure of the region.  A typical village was small, 
consisting of no more than twenty homes.  Each village was fortified with stone towers, 
affording both a position to fight from and cover for women and children.32   
Economically, the village was engaged in various forms of subsistence farming 
and animal husbandry.  Raiding was also an integral sector of the economy, and “…may 
have been the main business for some groups or individuals.”33  In the rugged terrain, 
raiding was a logical means of augmenting the village’s production, to such an extent that 
neighboring villages were regularly raided.  The constant threat of incursion resulted in a 
hyper-vigilant and thoroughly militarized society.34  Fierce individualism and 
independence were coupled with the militarism throughout the mountain tribes.   
In describing Chechen society, Michael Reynolds uses the phrase, “radically 
egalitarian.”35  This phrase seems appropriate, as each man was free to make his own 
decisions within the society’s social structures.  There was no aristocracy present among 
Chechen society.  Chechen society idealized independence, drawing its identity out of 
notions of courage, freedom, and resistance.  Each Chechen tribe was comprised of 
independent and militant freemen owing allegiance to only him and his family, such 
conditions within the tribes, was replicated among tribes.  No one tribe could extract 
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loyalty from another as the concept ran anathema to the very nature of Chechens.36  Up 
to this point, the Chechen tribes were largely independent.  A complex system of vendetta 
was the prime means of inter-tribal social conformity.  Vendetta’s were initiated between 
members of differing family groups, and more often than not were settled with some 
form of violence, although it was not uncommon for families to workout arrangements 
other than force.37 
In response to an uncomfortable and alien social structure, the Russians chose to 
force an artificial construct they were able to understand.  The structure preferred by 
imperial representatives was one that had a limited number of political powers, of which 
Russia could manipulate or threaten.  In practice, this meant Russian representatives 
would pick a local leader and imbue him with imperial legitimacy and material support, 
while fomenting conflict with another group perceived as antagonistic to Russian 
objectives.38  The whole process produced two effects; it intensified the imposition of 
externally defined notions of state, as well as focusing tribal aggression against Russia. It 
was through this artificial overlay that the Chechens were redefined as criminal.  
D. ISLAM AND REVENGE THE CEMENT OF THE PROTO-CHECHEN 
STATE 
The North Caucasus was among the first lands reached by Islam’s initial 
expansion.  As early as 642 AD, Muslim Arabs reached the city of Derbent in Dagestan.  
Despite the fervor of the invading Arabs, Caucasian resistance proved too formidable.  
Arab forces reoriented toward Tiflis, forgoing the conquest of Dagestan.  Several years 
later, the conquest of Dagestan was attempted a second time, with an even more 
disastrous result.39   
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Resulting from these defeats, Arab Muslims were never able to gain a firm hold in 
Dagestan or the more remote and inhospitable area of Chechnya.  The Arabs were able to 
conduct a limited number of successful punitive raids, in the process converting some 
Dagestani leader.  These conversions would be the Arabs’ legacy in the Caucasus, a 
region they considered to be populated by robbers and brigands.40  
After the withdrawal of the preponderance of Arab forces in the region, the next 
major upheaval in the Caucasus involved the Mongols.  After sweeping through the 
steppe, the Mongol armies turned toward that Caucasus.  They were initially successful in 
off balancing the mountain tribes.  However, fierce independence and rugged terrain were 
once again employed with great success.  Mountain fighters were so successful in 
raiding, that the Mongols began to send regular emissaries to the mountain tribes with 
tribute in exchange for protection from raids.41  In essence, the mountain tribes 
developed an early form of the protection racket employed by modern Chechen organized 
crime elements. 
Mongol occupation did have lasting effects other than the development of early 
protection rackets.  Mongols facilitated the spread of Islam, particularly among the 
Circassians.  Arab influences in Dagestan and Mongol influences, among the Circassians, 
planted the seeds of Islam in the Caucasus.  Acceptance of Islamic practices would take 
centuries to percolate through the mountain tribes.  Even when Islam did become 
adopted, it was done with a superficial knowledge of the religion and its practices.42 
Persian expeditions into Dagestan during the eighteenth century proved no more 
successful than previous conquests.  Mountain tribes of the North Caucasus banded 
together in a series of alliances against the common foe.  Adopting techniques that had 
proved successful against previous invaders the mountain tribes forced the withdrawal of 
Persian troops.  During this period, Islam played a limited role in unifying the mountain 
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tribes, primarily because of the limited penetration into tribal society, and an even more 
limited understanding of the religion’s major tenets.43  
Despite the limited penetration of Islam through out the Caucasus, there were 
some local leaders who were beginning to see a political structure beyond the tribe.  The 
spread of Sunni Islam was beginning to link concepts of religious practice, with the 
notion of a state.  The hadiths and the Quran provided the source of such thoughts.  In 
practice the merger was embodied in the sharia, a body of laws that proscribed the 
manner of social interactions.  Within the sharia was the concept of, dawlah, an abstract 
of the state that served as “the enforcer of law.”44  The spread of Islam carried with it the 
concept of a supra-tribal state.  It was this notion of state that would play an expanded 
role in the resistance efforts against Russian conquest of the Caucasus.45  
Much of the literature regarding early resistance in the Caucasus is focused on the 
exploits of Imam Shamil.  He led one of the longest and most successful resistance 
movements in the region gaining notoriety well beyond the region.  However, Russian 
interaction with rebellious Chechens dates farther back.  Drawing upon notions of a 
supra-tribal “state,” Imam Mansur led an uprising of Avar and Chechen tribes against 
imperial forces.46  Aided greatly by terrain and the call for a holy war against the 
Russians, Mansur defeated two Russian formations before his eventual defeat in 1790.   
The interesting portion of Mansur’s tale is not the defeat of a technologically 
superior force; rather it is that he identified the critical weakness of the mountain tribes.  
Mansur saw that only through a unifying construct would the tribes be able to resist 
Russian efforts.47  Upon initial glance it would appear that Mansur’s efforts fulfilled the 
Russian desire for a single political structure to co-opt or coerce.  Mansur’s rebellion did 
unify elements of the tribes, but only for a short period of time, directing their energy 
towards the Russian not each other.  Mansur’s rebellion identified the lack of systemic 
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cohesion among the Chechen tribes and the limited role Islam had in unifying the tribes.  
The two most significant remnants of Mansur’s rebellion were the growing utility of 
Islam as a unifying force, and the awareness that unified the mountain tribes were a valid 
threat to Russian control of the region. 
E. THE RISE OF GRASSROOTS CHECHNYA: RUSSIAN MILITARISM 
AND CHECHEN RESISTANCE  
Russia success against Mansur was achieved through the overwhelming 
application of military force.  Twenty-five thousand Russian regular troops assaulted 
Mansur’s base of operations and captured the leader, carting him off to St. Petersburg, 
effectively ending his insurrection.  However, pacifying the region was beyond the scope 
of a single raid.  The liberal application of force would be a central aspect to subsequent 
Russian efforts.  Russian military tactics applied in the Caucasus, during the nineteenth 
century were largely the product of two Russian generals: Aleksei Yermolov and A.A. 
Veliaminov.48   
Both figures were products of the Napoleonic Wars and shared a similar set of 
experiences.  However, they approached the situation in the Caucasus from different 
angles.  Veliaminov saw the Caucasus as a career artillery officer would, viewing it as an 
immense fortification that needed to be systematically reduced.49 
The Caucasus may be likened to a mighty fortress, marvelously strong by 
nature, artificially protected by military works, and defended by a 
numerous garrison.  Only thoughtless men would attempt to scale such a 
stronghold.  Wise commanders would see the necessity of having recourse 
to military art; would lay his parallels; advance by sap and mine; and so 
master the place.  The Caucasus, in my opinion, must be treated in the 
same way.50 
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This systematic, almost geometric vision, of reducing the Caucasus fortification 
might appear to be an early ‘hearts and mind’ campaign; in reality, it was far from that.  
Veliaminov envisioned his plan advancing upon the back of targeted violence and 
terrorism.  The violence would be facilitated by a constricting band of fortifications.  
From these forts, Russian forces would destroy villages, burn crops and drive off the 
population.  Captured lands would then be redistributed to loyal subjects, often time 
Cossack settlers.  The ultimate goal was to sap the ability of Chechen, and other tribes, to 
resist Russian rule, while building a buffer of reliable people.51 
Yermolov, acting and the first imperial viceroy to the Caucasus, provided another 
conceptual framework for Russian actions in the Caucasus.  His view was that of 
complete Russification of the Caucasus, devoid of independent or autonomous ethnic 
states.52  However, in execution Yermolov favored solely military means without any 
effort to co-opt the mountain tribes.  His strategy appeared to rely only upon widespread 
violence, with the goal of instilling total fear within the Chechens and other mountain, 
tribes so that further resistance would be unthinkable.  Yermolov was quoted as saying, “I 
desire that the terror of my name shall guard our frontiers more potently than chains of 
fortresses.”53  His concept was placed into practice following the establishment of 
Fortress Grozny in 1819, and continued for several campaign seasons before his relief.54 
It is not entirely surprising that the Chechens responded to the violence, not with 
submission, but with rebellion.  Up to this point the Chechen tribes were largely 
independent and had responded to previous foreign incursions with violent resistance.  
Their decentralized social structure made coercion difficult and capitulation to anyone 
especially a foreigner was unthinkable.55  The seemingly random relations between 
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Chechen tribes flummoxed Russian military leaders, when they occasioned to consider 
the relations at all.  More often, the Russians operated from a position of cultural 
ignorance owing to a lack of allies among the mountain tribes and a deficit of linguistic 
capacity.  The flexible and nuanced forms of state making and subversion used by 
Muscovy in its path to consolidation of the steppe were not used in the mountains, nor 
could they be.  The egalitarian social structure, with its system of vendetta, relied heavily 
upon negotiations and a keen understanding of cultural motivators and the local 
languages, which the Russians noticeably lacked.  From the beginning, the Russian 
efforts left the Chechens with a single recourse, violence; which when violently resisted 
confirmed Russian beliefs regarding the viability of a Chechen vassal state.   
Russian brutality and Sufi Islam provided the necessary foundation for the 
formation of a proto-Chechen state.  Imam Shamil provided the catalyst needed to unite 
the Chechens.  Shamil was not the first to attempt to unite the various mountain tribes, 
Imam Mansur had done a similar act the previous century, and Ghazi Mohammad, 
another Islamic leader, had attempted it in the early 1800s.  Shamil succeeded where 
others had failed.  While alive, he managed to build a mythology around himself.  Several 
near death experiences, as well as his religions discipline and martial prowess aided him 
in this task.  Shamil further refined his myth, through careful cultivation of his image as a 
leader.56  The first Chechen state-like structure, above the village level, was a product of 
Shamil’s leadership and ability to manipulate Chechen hatred of Russian military actions 
and the tenets of Islam. 
The question faced by Shamil was how to formalize the federation of Avar and 
Chechen tribes.  Islam provided a contextual structure for government and he provided 
the leadership, but there was still a problem of putting theory into practice.  It is often 
forgotten that Shamil’s rise to prominence in Chechnya was not an easy process.  Shamil 
solidified his position around, 1834, putting into place the final elements of the proto-
state with the establishment of a standing military force.  Through a combination of 
incentives and personal charisma, Shamil bound the combatants to himself instead of the 
                                                 
56 Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800–2000, 41. 
 23 
village leaders.  Personal loyalty allowed Shamil to fight beyond the bounds of village 
territories, creating a more flexible and capable force.  Like all states, Shamil faced the 
problem of how to maintain both a credible military and the necessary administrative 
structures.57 
Shamil solved these problems by establishing an administration comprised of 
secular and religious leaders.  At the village level, the secular and religious leaders ruled 
in tandem, and were obliged to provide 300 horsemen loyal to Shamil.58  One can 
realistically expect that the loyalty of the 300 horsemen remained split between Shamil 
and the traditional familiar structures. On the whole their loyalty to Shamil was much 
more firmly planted than the Russian conscripts was to the Tsar.  Shamil went beyond 
establishing village leadership; he then linked the villages into provinces with 
concomitant military obligations.59  It was the linking of village entities into provinces 
where Chechnya took its first steps beyond a solely tribal government.   
Shamil’s efforts were not only limited to the martial realm, he organized a nascent 
postal service.  While the postal service was most likely used for primarily military 
means, it could be employed to address other communications needs of the local and 
provincial leadership.  Furthermore, Shamil implemented a rudimentary legal system 
based upon sharia law.  Implementation of the legal system was tied to Shamil’s travels.  
Reports indicate that as Shamil traveled through the mountains he had among his 
entourage an executioner, with a “long handled ax for swift decapitations.”60  During the 
1840s and 1850s a growing Chechen state was fashioned around the visions of Shamil, it 
drew in Christians and Muslims alike and resulted in the continuation of local resistance 
to Russian military conquest.61  
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Chechnya’s first attempts at a supra-tribal government effectively ended before 
Shamil’s surrender in 1859.  The structure had never become institutionalized, and relied 
completely on Shamil’s personal charisma.  As the conflict played out the system of 
administration eroded and traditional tribal structures and inter-tribal competition 
replaced Shamil’s leadership.  It was not only a resurgence of the more basic motivators 
of the Chechen people; Russia attempts at co-opting anti-Shamil elements were also a 
significant factor.62   
Following Shamil’s surrender, Tsar Alexander promised a number of privileges to 
the Chechens, including relief from taxation and conscription, as well as the use of local 
legal practices.63  Ostensibly, this might appear as at least a nod by the tsar towards 
autonomy under Russian rule.  However, it was more likely a case of the lack of capacity 
to affect full subjugation of the Chechen highlands.   Additionally, during the period of 
imperial benefits, the Russian military undertook an extensive relocation program within 
controlled territories.  Chechens, among other populations were resettled as a means of 
preventing future rebellion, or at least the local support of rebels.64  The relocations did 
not prevent a series of rebellions that continued until the fall of the Russian Empire. 
F. SOVIET CHECHNYA  
Social and political tension had been building in Russia during the final decades 
of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth century.  While Alexander II 
officially eliminated serfdom in 1861, the conditions of rural Russians did not improve.65  
In many parts of Russia, rural populations were in effect still tied to the land and 
oppressed by the tsarist government.  Social programs undertaken by Alexander II, did 
little to calm the unrest or mitigate the inequality, and were essentially negated by 
Alexander III’s repressions.66  Limited self-government and an equally limited 
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parliament did little to offset the police state in effect changing Russia very little 
throughout the nineteenth century.67  Tsar Nicholas II assumed power under the shadow 
of growing social tension.  
Tsarist Russia entered into World War I, with the memory of a recent defeat to the 
Japanese still painfully vivid.  In 1914, the opportunity of a great social cleansing 
appealed as much too Russian aristocracy as it did throughout the rest of Europe.  On the 
eve of war, Russia saw the possibility of expanding its territory and influence into 
southeastern Europe.  What came out of the war was a sort of social cleansing, but not of 
the type initially envisioned.   
As the war raged on, fighting along the Eastern Front intensified.  Russian troops 
were suffering considerable casualties as German offensives continued.  By 1917, the 
Russian army had mobilized nearly 15 million men and had suffered 1.6 million killed in 
action, two million wounded and an additional two million captured.  The strain of 
extended high intensity combat had brought the social and economic conditions in the 
country to a crescendo.  Nicholas II assumed direct command of the military early in the 
conflict.  He was able to maintain the cohesion of the government only as long as the 
military remained successful.  However, as the military and social conditions deteriorated 
discord within the government grew.  Nicholas II abdicated his throne, and his 
government evaporated.68     
A provisional government assumed nominal power but was hampered by 
infighting and subterfuge.  In addition to the political infighting the war with Germany 
continued, but would be fought with a dwindling military and even less political 
leadership.  Military defeats continued and eventually led to the fragmentation of the 
provisional government.  It was at this point that Lenin’s Bolsheviks were able to assume 
a significant role in the Russian political scene.69  Lenin called for a nationwide election 
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for the Constituent Assembly, of which the Bolsheviks fared less well than the Social 
Revolutionaries.  As a means of rectifying the election results, Lenin with the support of 
loyal military members disbanded the Assembly, stating that represented a “step 
backward” for the workers revolution.70 
Assuming control of what remained of the government; Lenin was able to 
negotiate a treaty, although on unequal terms, with the Germans.  Russia lost a 
considerable portion of its population and industrial base, plunging the remainder of the 
country into an even deeper abyss.  The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly did not 
convey control of the country to the Bolsheviks; in fact it opened the door for a violent 
civil war.  Bolsheviks, with the support of much of the military, fought against elements 
of the Social Revolutionaries and pro-tsarist White Russians.  Throughout the civil war, 
Bolsheviks made a series of tactical alliances and promises that would be discarded upon 
consolidation of their control over the country.  The Caucasus was no exception to this 
process.    
The Soviets renewed their assault on the Caucasus drawing upon various 
interpretation of Marxist theory, regarding a sequential progress through nationalism to 
communism.  At the core of the Soviet effort was the attempt to impose a national 
structure upon the tribal Chechens.  The national structure the Soviets chose was 
grounded in their perception of the ethnic composition of the region.  Ethnic restructuring 
would remain a facet of future Soviet undertakings in the Caucasus, and would have an 
effect upon the character of the government structures, as well as that of the Chechen 
identity. However, before the Soviets could restructure national territories in the 
Caucasus they needed to regain control of the region. 
G. CONTROL OF THE CAUCASUS   
The process of re-establishing control over the Caucasus was entwined with the 
progress of the civil war, and in doing so the Soviets took a page from the tsarist 
playbook but with a Bolshevik flair.  Bolsheviks established temporary alliances with 
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local elites in an effort to undermine regional competitors.  At this time the Chechen 
elites comprised a mixture of tribal leaders and the local intellectuals, both groups were 
drawn into alliances with the Bolsheviks under a belief that it was a short-term beneficial 
arrangement, which would end with Chechen sovereignty. 
The early years of the Russian Revolution were chaotic, but few areas were as 
chaotic as the North Caucasus.  At least five separate entities had declared legitimate 
authority over the region and each conducted extensive military efforts to consolidate 
their power.71    
Under the leadership of a wealthy Chechen industrialist, Tapa Chermoev the 
Union of Mountain Peoples was founded.  The union was founded in Vladikavkaz in 
1917, with the intention of forming an autonomous state within a Russian framework.72  
Chermoev’s Union was an inclusive organization, attempting to blend Chechen 
nationalism with that of other ethnicities in the North Caucasus.  In theory this broad base 
should have strengthened the movement but that was not the case.  Chermoev’s Union 
faced a string of military defeats, and within months of its inception the Union was driven 
from the Caucasus to Batum never to return.73  
There was another Chechen party who saw civil war as an opportune time to 
declare independence.  In 1918, two Chechen Sufi leaders, Ali Akushinski Gotsinskii and 
Sheikh Uzun Haji, established the North Caucasus Emirate.  They must have thought the 
Bolshevik regime, with its anti-imperial rhetoric, would be supportive of their theocracy.  
This assumption proved to be a strategic mistake.  Upon the defeat of General Denikin, 
the Bolsheviks terminated the alliance and turned upon their previous allies.  Gotsinskii’s 
forces were disbanded, but were not driven from region.  Despite the scattering of 
Gotsinskii’s forces, the Bolsheviks were unable to eradicate an urge for an Islamic 
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Chechnya and would have to deal with Gotsinskii again in late 1920.  This time, 
Gotsinskii rallied his followers under the call for ‘national liberation’ and ‘a sharia-
state’.74  A grassroots, religious state was not what the Soviets had in mind and in a 
theme that would continue until the present day, religiously based Chechen governments 
would be viewed as a threat.  Moscow’s response to such a threat tended to be military in 
character followed with the imposition of an artificial government structure. 
Like previous attempts at establishing an Islamic state, Gotsinskii’s North 
Caucasian Emirate, was branded a criminal entity and a threat.  Resistance to Bolshevik 
control of the Caucasus was dealt with by harsh military retaliation.  By 1925, when the 
Red Army had largely put down most active resistance, Chechnya had been laid to waste.  
Nearly one hundred villages had been destroyed, the population was reduced to near 
starvation and in such dire economic straits that many were forced to wear pelts for 
clothing.  It is not surprising that many Chechens perceived this period to be a second 
imperial conquest and subsequently developed a deep mistrust of Soviet policies there 
after.75 
H. INITIAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND TERRITORIAL 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Early Soviet policies in Chechnya were an extension of imperial policies, 
interwoven with Soviet philosophy, and lessons learned during their own attempts at 
control of the mountains.  Imperial policies towards the emerging ethnic nationalities 
were transferred to the new Soviet state through a stable of Russian ethnographic 
experts.76  Chechen territory was redefined several times during the 1920s and 1930s by 
Moscow, in order to establish the most advantageous mix of terrain and population.  
Chechnya originated from the earlier Dagestan and Mountain Autonomous Socialist 
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Soviet Republics (ASSRs), an organization designed to unite Caucasus groups in a 
common support for the Soviets.  The regional support expected by the Soviets never 
materialized, instead local communities continued to resist Moscow’s control. In an effort 
to divide recalcitrant populations the Mountain ASSRs were subdivided, and Chechnya 
was granted oblast status in 1922.77    
Soviet inclusion of local customs in governance was largely a show.  It allowed 
time for Moscow and the Red Army to strengthen their position relative to the threats.  In 
the case of Chechnya this included identifying local pro-Soviet Chechens, re-drawing the 
borders, and adjusting the demographics of the territory.  Locating pro-Soviet Chechens 
proved to be difficult, as mentioned above even though quotas in the local government 
structures were increased for those of titular nationalities, there was never enough 
interested or qualified Chechens.78 
Through the 1920s and 1930s, the entire North Caucasus went through a process 
of redistricting that resembled a large game of musical homelands.79  The Chechens got 
their own oblast in 1922, while the Ingush received oblast status in 1924 along with a 
series of other territories.  In 1935, Chechnya and Ingushetia were merged into a single 
oblast and in 1936 the oblast was transformed to an autonomous republic.  Redistricting 
was a fairly easy process on the part of the Soviets, and was largely undertaken for 
show.80   
In addition to establishing a territorial division, the Soviets attempted to bring 
non-Russians into the party establishment to carry out party objectives.  Integrating locals 
into the governments was a two-pronged process originating out of the earlier Soviet 
nationalities policy.  The process involved promoting national elites and national 
languages, both processes would be merged and referred to as korenizatsii.  Lenin and  
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Stalin viewed the process as a means to an end, with the end being increased control of 
the territory by the Party.  Both felt that, korenizatsii, would make the process feel more 
‘native.’81   
Like most other efforts at state building in the Soviet Union, this process was 
initiated from Moscow, and applied throughout the entire union with little regard for 
regional differences.  Unfortunately, what worked in western Russia would not 
necessarily work in Chechnya.  Qualified non-ethnic workers were indiscriminately 
replaced, often times with less qualified locals.82  In Chechnya this arbitrary practice 
proved to be difficult, there had always been difficulties finding Chechens to participate 
as such in the early years of the various Chechen republics Russians or other non-
Chechens filled most of the positions.83 
Soviet efforts at manipulating the make-up of regional governments failed to 
significantly increase non-Russian participation. This was particularly true in the case of 
Chechnya, where Chechen participation in government steadily decreased through the 
1930s.84  The net effect of the Soviet efforts inhibited Chechens from playing a 
significant role in the nominally Chechen government.  This Chechen government would 
last until the entire population was sent into exile on 23 February 1944. 
I. THE AMAZING REAPPEARING CHECHEN REPUBLIC 
From 23 February 1943 until 1956 there was no Chechen republic, and when it 
finally reappeared in the wake of Khrushchev’s “secret speech,” it only vaguely 
resembled its previous form.  The border had been shifted farther to the north in order to 
include a large Russian population.  The shift of the border had a very obvious purpose, 
to further marginalize any returning Chechen population.  In addition to this  
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demographic manipulation, the Soviet government all but excluded Chechens from 
anything but the lower levels of the political system, gone were the days of the 
“affirmative action empire.”85 
Chechens had return to a Chechnya that needed no Chechen leadership.  It was 
not until 1989, that a Chechen was allowed to lead the republics Party organization.  
They were excluded from any substantial position not only in the government, but also 
throughout society.  There was no influential Chechen position in the regions petroleum 
industry, partly because of low education levels, but also from more deliberate 
exclusionary practices.86  These factors resulted in another dispersion of the Chechen 
population, this time for economic reasons.   
While the period from 1960 to the fall of the Soviet Union, was the most peaceful 
years the Chechens had known in the twentieth century, they were critical in setting the 
conditions for the future criminalized state.  During this period, Chechens continued to be 
largely excluded from anything but the lowest levels of industry and government.  
However, they were able to survive because they continued to develop strong non-
traditional governance structures, ones that reached back to religious and tribal 
predecessors and had assumed a growing criminal nature.  The Chechens were able to 
extend their familial networks throughout the Soviet Union.  This would be a critical 
asset in forming and sustaining a nascent independent Chechnya.   
In late 1990s, the most significant event in Chechen politics occurred.  The 
previously amorphous Chechen political networks solidified.  They took the form of the 
All-National Congress of Chechen Peoples (OKChN) and were led by a Chechen 
businessman from Moscow, the head of the Chechen construction department and a 
Chechen poet.87  How these three individuals united is unknown, but it was likely  
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through a combination of ethnic and business connections.  It is also fairly likely that 
these relationships were of an extra-legal nature, as the Soviet Union was still only 
experimenting with capitalist structures.   
What motivated the leaders of the OKChN to unite?  Was it love of country and 
countrymen? Was it a desire for a Jeffersonian democracy? Or was it something more 
tangible like the potential personal financial gains to be had in a collapsing empire?  
OKChN leadership looked for a figurehead, someone that could rally the population with 
images of historic Chechen heroes.  They found Major General Djohar Musayevich 
Dudayev.  Dudayev, the only Chechen to reach the rank of General in the Soviet military 
had also played a role in the Estonian independence movement by stating he would deny 
Soviet troops from entering Estonian airspace.88  Aside from the outward leadership traits 
the OKChN saw a man who could be molded to their needs, and on that account they 
were correct.  Dudayev became increasingly reliant on corrupted state officials and 
criminals, most of which supported his efforts at independence out of self-interest.  This 
was the beginning of the outright criminalization of the Chechen government, a 
criminalization that continues today and continues to threaten the security of the region. 
J. CONCLUSION 
Chechnya in its many incarnations has never managed to become a true nation-
state in the modern context.  As a political organization it has made quantum leaps in 
form and substance of its political structures, all of which have been spurred by external 
stimuli.  Untouched for centuries, the Chechens were essentially unchanged. They existed 
in a society of near complete anarchy, living in small tribal communities and subsisting 
on a combination of agriculture and raiding.  In this environment independence was not 
only prized it was critical for survival.  The same independence that would cause tribes to 
fight each other would serve to unite them all against outside invaders. 
It was the prolonged interaction with the Russians that produced the first radical 
change in the concept of a collective Checheness.  Contact with the Russians was not the 
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main reason for this change; instead, it was the character of the contact.  Russian imperial 
expansion and rule had been shaped by centuries of interaction with, and rule over, an 
ever-expanding multi-ethnic state.  This had produced an eclectic system of rules, none of 
which fit the Chechen situation.  
Simultaneous with the arrival of Russia was the emergence of a more developed 
and expansive concept of Islam.  Islam had made slow inroads into Chechnya owing to 
the general tendency to resist any outside force.  However, it had permeated to a 
sufficient degree during the nineteenth century that it served as a unifying force for 
Chechens.  In addition to an emotional call to arms, Sufi Islam provided a structure for a 
supra-tribal government along with the concept of a greater community. 
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III. THE PATH TOWARDS CRIMINALITY: CRIMINALIZATION 
OF THE CHECHEN IDENTITY 
In the previous chapter, we looked at the factors involved in the various attempts 
at building an independent and semi-independent Chechen state.  Much of the focus of 
state formation involved the interplay between an artificial structure imposed from 
Moscow and the grassroots governmental structures generated by the Chechens 
themselves.  The formation of a universal Chechen identity will be framed in a similar 
structure, contrasting an external perception of a Chechen identity with the Chechen’s 
view of self.  Perception plays a critical element in the discussion of identity, as the 
perception of a single event will naturally vary depending upon the observer’s point of 
view; one man’s hero is another man’s criminal or terrorist.  Over the course of two 
centuries Chechen and Russian views of each other have been shaped by thousands of 
separate events. 
The criminalization of the Chechen identity did not happen in a single cataclysmic 
instant; instead, it was an evolutionary process.  Criminalization was the result of two 
opposing forces, one directed from Moscow the other originated from the Caucasus.  
Undergirding both was a clash of interests between security concerns of iterative Russian 
states and the desire for independence and continuity among the Chechens.  The manner 
by which the Russian, then Soviets, imposed their control over the Chechens produced a 
violent resistance by the Chechen population.  Population politics, as it developed during 
the nineteenth century added to the violence of the Russian and Soviet policies in 
Chechnya, providing a pseudo-scientific basis for the criminalization of entire sections of 
the population.  Fierce independence has always characterized the Chechen tribes.  
Instances where outside forces encroach on Chechen territory have always been met with 
resistance by an alliance of Chechen tribes.  Over several centuries, the resistance became 
more violent and the cohesion among the tribes became more enduring.  
Throughout the process of resistance, there were four critical factors responsible 
the unification and criminalization of the Chechen identity: the spread of Sufi Islam 
through the Chechen tribes, nineteenth century Russian romantic literature, Shamil’s 
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resistance and the deportation.  Islam provided the Chechens the concept of, dawlah, a 
community beyond the tribe.  By the nineteenth century the tenets of Islam were 
internalized enough to augment the perception of Russian threat and bind the various 
Chechen tribes together.  Sufi Islam would become a key component of the Chechen 
identity, one that separated them from the Russians and Soviets.89   
At roughly the same time Sufi Islam was increasing in importance as an element 
of the Chechen identity, Russian authors were creating their own version of the typical 
Chechen.  Lermontov, Pushkin, and Tolstoy created an image of an idealized North 
Caucasus among the social and political elites of the era.  All three merged their personal 
experiences in the Caucasus with a romantic perception of the people and terrain to create 
an enduring myth.  Criminality was integral to the myth all three authors created.  
Imam Shamil’s prolonged resistance provided the tangible evidence of the fierce 
and intractable nature of the Chechen tribes.  Both Russian/Soviet elites and the Chechen 
community would continuously reframe Shamil’s endeavors.  Shamil provided a figure to 
focus Chechen identity, particularly in its struggle against Moscow.  Similarly, tsarist and 
then Soviet leaders used the image of Shamil for their purposes, either as a hero or a 
criminal.90    
The three initial factors provided the foundation for the development of a 
common Chechen identity and its criminalization.  It was the 1944 Deportation that 
crystalized and criminalized the Chechen identity.  The mass exile fused the Chechens 
together through shared adversity and established the Soviet authorities as the common 
enemy.  Life in exile deepened the connection among Chechens while alienating them 
from the developing Soviet society.  It was the criminalization and alienation from 
society that facilitated the development of Chechen organized criminal elements.  
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A. BANDITRY AND THE STATE 
The concepts of crime and criminality are central to the theme of this chapter.  If 
we are to argue that the criminalization of the Chechen identity has played a role in the 
development of uniquely Chechen organized crime elements and these organizations 
have in turn played a role in the evolution and formation of the Chechen state, it benefits 
us to define some concepts.  Crime is a social and political process and requires an 
understanding of the historical and social context in which it develops.  Throughout the 
twentieth century criminologists have been working on the link between crime, society 
and governmental forces, gradually taking a more holistic view of the phenomenon.91  
Theoretical constructs of crime and state-making are also significant to the Chechen 
example, as criminalization of the Chechens resulted from their resistance to the 
expansion of the Russian then Soviet states.  
Of particular relevance, are the discussions of banditry by Eric Hobsbawm and 
Anton Blok.  Many of the elements present in Hobsbawm and Blok’s theories are present 
in the Russo-Chechen relationship.  Most obvious is the description of early Russians, 
such as Yermolov, who likened the Chechens to bandits.  More significantly is the 
struggle to consolidate legitimate control over Chechnya and the Chechens.  For 
Hobsbawm criminality could only be understood within the context of a central power’s 
attempt to extend its control to the territorial periphery.92   
Banditry can assume various forms depending upon the environmental and social 
situation where it originates.  Despite the possible differences, there are some similar root 
sources of banditry.  The process of exerting control is one such commonality.  At the 
end of this struggle, one entity emerges in a dominant position and thereby defines the 
bounds of acceptable society.93  Banditry emerges out of the struggle and the redefined 
social order.94 
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Control over a territory can refer to a range of things, but at its essence is the 
ability to control the legitimate use of violence.95  This struggle for monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence in Chechnya occurred several times during the Russo-Chechen 
relationship: first during the early rebellions, then during the 1920s, and finally during the 
latest two Russo-Chechen Wars.  Each time it was the side that was able to “purvey 
violence on a larger scale, more effectively…and with readier collaboration from 
neighbor” who was able to define the extent of criminality.96   In nearly all cases 
Moscow and St. Petersburg were able to monopolize violence in the degree necessary to 
control Chechnya. 
Hobsbawm identifies several traits common to bandits.  Bandits are generally 
from the fringes of society, most often from rural communities with a surplus of labor.97  
An integral portion of Hobsbawm’s concept is the presence of class tension.  This is 
related to the development of his concept of social banditry, whereby banditry is used to 
right social wrongs from within a society.98  Resulting from a narrow definition of social 
banditry, raiding tribes, such as the Chechens, only receive a limited consideration, a 
point that Anton Blok readily identifies.99  Chechen criminality cannot be analyzed in 
isolation, as it is directly tied to the Russo-Chechen relationship.  When viewed in this 
capacity, the possibility of Chechen social banditry is increased.  The Chechens did 
engage in banditry as both a means of survival and to punish Russian, and later Soviet, 
oppression. 
State-making relies heavily upon coercion, specifically, the monopoly upon the 
legitimate use of violence.  Inherent to this concept are two aspects, the capacity to 
monopolize violence and the perception of legitimacy over the designated territory.  
Charles Tilly constructed an analogy between the state-making and an organized crime 
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protection racket.100  Tilly developed his theoretical structure to explain the process of 
state consolidation in Western Europe.  While the conditions in Chechnya over the past 
200-years are significantly different from sixteenth century Europe there are important 
parallels.  Throughout the Russo-Chechen relationship there was a struggle over control 
of a territory, its people and resources.101   
In both situations, the conflict was played out largely through the use of armed 
elements in an effort to subdue rivals and cow the population.  The interaction of these 
armed elements that provided a tangible perception of criminality to the relationship.  
From the Russian/Soviet perspective the Chechens were violating the sovereign’s 
authority.  
Interwoven in the struggle for control is the notion of freedom.  For Hobsbawm, 
banditry in all its forms is also about freedom.102  Freedom in this context primarily deals 
with the absence of control from a centralized power, not simply the ability to go where 
one pleases but to do what one wants.  Chechens have always placed a particular 
emphasis on freedom.103  The desire for freedom and independence would remain a 
contributing factor to the Chechens criminalization, as elements of the Chechen 
population would continuously resist control from Russian and Soviet governments. 
B. POPULATION POLITICS: EXTRACTING THE TROUBLESOME 
“ELEMENTS” 
Throughout the initial stages of sustained interaction with the Chechen tribes, 
historic pattern of imperial management were employed.  Such methods focused on co-
opting key leaders within the tribes, by integrating them into the Russian imperial 
structure.  Those who could not be co-opted would be vigorously pursued by military 
means.  Because of the varieties of cultures and size of the empire, Russian policies were 
not uniform.  Policies directed toward the Polish populations varied considerably from 
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those used to manage Central Asian populations.104  Russian policies toward the North 
Caucasus were no different; in fact, they may have been even more varied because of the 
number of cultures present. 
Russian policies toward the imperial fringes began to change during the 
nineteenth century.  Loyalty to the tsar was still a major consideration in the imperial 
assessment of its subjects, but developments in scientific and political thought were 
growing in importance.  Nationalism among ethnic groups throughout Western Europe 
was beginning to concern the Russian leaders, since they were attempting to manage the 
largest multi-ethnic empire in the world.  Most concerning was the threat ethno-
nationalism posed to the Russian feudal structure.105   
These concerns were compounded by a growing deficit in Russia’s industrial 
base.  While one of the largest economies of the nineteenth century, Russia was primarily 
an agrarian economy.106  What Russia possessed in terms of industry was located in its 
western most regions and in need of modernization.  Expansion of the economy was seen 
to be achievable through the application of modern scientific practices.  In addition to the 
modernization of the Russian industrial base, the tsarist government undertook a massive 
expansion of its internal rail system.  The growth of the rail system had two purposes, to 
promote the economy and facilitate internal security.107   
Managing a multi-ethnic empire was also deemed possible through the application 
of scientific methods.  As a remedy for many of the demographic and social issues the 
Russians applied emerging scientific principles to understanding, and then isolating 
harmful elements of society.  Much of the theories that drove Russian, and later Soviet, 
policies were based on the nineteenth century understanding of population politics.108 
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Population politics at its essence was the process of scientifically analyzing the 
population in an effort to identify social malignancies, and the process by which the 
government could intervene with a solution.  The process as a whole was a merger of the 
new fields of anthropology, criminology, economics, and statistics.  It sought to modify 
the relationship between the individual and society writ large.  It is this new view of the 
relationship that is most significant for the Russo-Chechen relationship.  Mainly, because 
of the growing belief that society, like the body, is composed of distinct elements and that 
dangerous ones can be identified and extracted in order to make the remaining elements 
stronger.109 
Russians seized upon the notion of population politics, and its pre-cursor military 
statistics, early in the nineteenth century; by mid-century, the Russian General Staff had 
put the theory into practice.110  It was Dmitrii Miliutin, who extended military statistics 
to the formal education arena, making it one of the core fields of study for the General 
Staff Academy.111  Throughout the century, it was military officers and imperial 
administrators who continued to refine the practical application of military statistics, 
representing the multitude of ethnicities present in the Russian empire with a series of 
population categories.112  For many of these practicing statisticians a large part of their 
effort was spent focused on Russia’s southern border and the ongoing Chechen 
insurgency.  
Population politics was not isolated to tsarist Russia; its tenets were passed along 
to Soviet military and political leaders.  Soviet military leaders continued to carry the 
baton of training subsequent generations in the theory and application of military 
statistics, thereby enabling a continuation of population politics.  Soviet leaders expressed 
their opinion regarding the importance of statistics in 1920 stating statistics, “were a tool 
for governing and organizing the state.”113  The end goal of population politics remained 
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the same, stability; it was the method of categorizing that was modified under the Soviets.  
Soviet leaders now defined elements as anti-revolutionary rather than the cause of a 
social illness.114 
The notion of “elements” within society permeated Soviet thought to the point 
that it became a main stay within the common discourse.115  Soviet military and security 
agencies spoke in terms of elements within the population that were the sources of 
security concerns.  However, depending upon the given time and region what constituted 
a given “element” was subject to change.  Interestingly the label of “bandit” was applied 
nearly universally to those elements deemed to be malignant.  Increasing use of this label 
began during the civil war but has continued to be used today116 
C. ISLAM AS AN IDENTIFIER 
One of the readily identifiable features of a given ethnicity, aside from physical 
appearance, is its religion.  Religion has always been an issue of importance to the 
Russian Empire.  Well before the nineteenth century, Russian leaders were concerned 
with religion primarily as an aspect of security.  There was fear that the Islamic empires 
to the south would undermine Russian expansion into the Caucasus through the basis of a 
common religion.117   
The process of utilizing religion as a means to categorize imperial subjects 
predates the implementation of population politics.  Through the fourteenth century, 
concurrent with the Russian expansion into Kazan, religion was used as a distinguishing 
characteristic of imperial subjects.  During the subsequent centuries, the Russians 
undertook an intermittent program of forced conversions to Orthodoxy.  It was believed 
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that conversion was the only means of ensuring loyalty to the tsar.118  By the eighteenth 
century the practice of distinguishing subjects by religion was well in place.119  
As the eighteenth century ended, religion was not only a means by which external 
powers grouped North Caucasian tribes but increasingly a way for Caucasians to identify 
themselves.  As mentioned earlier, the process of assimilating Islam into the Caucasian 
tribal structure was slow.  Slow progress had been made from the sixth century Arab 
incursions, but by the end of the eighteenth century Islam had become an important social 
identifier.  However, Islam’s penetration was still far from complete and uniform.  Two 
main forms of Sufi Islam were present in the region, Naqshbandi and Qadiri.  Even this is 
misleading, as the practice of each form varied from valley to valley and village to 
village.120 
A network of religious schools preaching the Naqshbandi version of Sufi Islam 
expanded out of Dagestan.121  Naqshbandi tended towards a more aggressive and 
fundamental interpretation of Islam, this tended to appeal to the martial character of the 
Chechens.122  As this form merged with the more fundamental aspects of the Chechen 
character, it was easier to spread, thereby providing a basis for a common identity.  In 
addition to providing the Chechens with a concept of a community beyond the tribe, 
Naqshbandi called its followers to resist outside influences that were attempting to 
corrupt Islam.  Followers could be called upon to support a holy war, jihad, or, gazavat, 
as it was called in the Caucasus.123  It was this call to arms that first unified the tribes 
under a common identity not just a common purpose.  As Muslims, the tribes were taught 
to set aside inter-tribe conflict to resist the invaders.  Ironically, it was through this 
unified resistance that the perception of a criminal Chechen identity expanded.  The 
efforts of Chechen resistance figures such as Sheik Mansur and Imam Shamil connected 
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Islam and Chechens with criminality in the minds of the Russians.  These same figures 
glorified martial skills and resistance in the minds of the Chechens.  While the connection 
in the minds of the Chechens may not have had a criminal overtone, it did result in a 
belief that the Chechens were outside of Russian society.124   
D. SHAMIL’S RESISTANCE 
Another event critical in the shaping of the perception of Chechen criminality was 
the war waged by Imam Shamil.  Shamil’s resistance effort would influence Chechens 
and Russians alike well after the fall of the Soviet Union.  This perception of criminality 
was aided in part by the tsarist implementation of population politics with its attempts to 
extract bandit elements from the Caucasus.  Russian policy in the Caucasus to isolate 
criminal elements was also aided by an empire-wide emphasis upon the criminality of 
banditry.  In the early 1820s the tsarist government implemented stricter legal regulations 
upon the nomadic peoples of the steppe and Siberia, with a focus on robbery and 
plunder.125  Despite differences in the application of imperial rule, it is logical that a 
similar legal definition would apply to the Chechen tribes who were also engaging in 
raiding and threatening Russian supply lines.  Not only were Shamil’s forces posing a 
viable military threat, they tended to undertake raids in order to sustain warriors and 
communities living in the remote mountain valleys. 
Russian military leaders operating in the Caucasus were at a loss when presented 
with the difficulty of defeating Shamil’s fighters.  With the successes of the Russian 
military during the early decades of the nineteenth century, Russian leaders were 
consistently striving for a decisive military victory over the Chechens.126  However, the 
mountains did not lend themselves to a massed infantry battle to be culminated with a 
cavalry charge.  Mountain fighting tended to favor the light infantry employed in ambush 
or skirmishers, a lesson that took loss of several regiments before the Russians were to 
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learn.  The fact that Chechens did not fight like a civilized combatant reinforced the 
perception that they, like many other of the empire’s people were little more than 
savages.127 
Chechen criminality was further reinforced in they eyes of the Russian by their 
seemingly primitive social structure, alien cultural practices and emphasis on martial 
skill.  Academics, drawing largely upon Russian military statistics and foreign observers 
describe the Chechen political structure as largely anarchic, being based on nothing larger 
than an extended family unit.128  Individuals who had reported to meet Chechens often 
noted their strange practices such as those to recompense for violations of the social code.  
Buchan notes the Chechens possess. 
…on the one hand reckless courage, extreme generosity, hospitality, 
loyalty, respect of the aged and love of animals: on the other hand, a 
sensibility to offense and a childish vindictiveness which was expressed in 
perpetual and blood-thirsty vendettas, extreme personal vanity, a 
disinclination to submit to discipline, or to undertake regular work, 
cruelty, callousness and violence129  
If resistance to Russian authority was at the core of banditry, then Shamil was the 
quintessential Chechen bandit.  From an early age he began developing the skills he 
would use to resist the Russian, particularly the “mountain virtues of skill with gun, 
kindjal (knife), and shashka (sword).130  With these skills Shamil combined a reputation 
as a religious figure to create and lead a 30-year resistance.  In doing so he deepened the 
myth surrounding him and the fierceness of Chechen fighters.   
Shamil’s resistance managed to merge traditional Chechen characteristics with an 
Islamic social structure.  While this placed him and his followers outside of the norms of 
                                                 
127 Michael Khodarkovsky, “Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects: Constructing Non-Christian 
Identities in Early Modern Russia” in Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini eds. Russia’s Orient: 
Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 9–26.  
Michael Khodarkovsky describes in detail the reason for Russian perception of savagery among its 
periphery in his work 
128 Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 28–29. 
129 John Buchan, The Baltic and Caucasian States (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923), 179. Quoted 
in Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict: 1800–2000: A Deadly Embrace (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2001), 29. 
130 Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 41.  
 46 
Russian society, it was the way in which he conducted the resistance the cemented the 
identity of bandit.  During his resistance, the Chechens avoided any attempt by Russian 
forces to engage in a pitched battle.  Like Robin Hood, Shamil and his troops stayed 
hidden in the forests and mountains and engaged the Russians only when they could 
ensure a Chechen victory.  In order to augment the meager provisions of the Chechen 
tribes, Shamil’s troops engaged in a liberal raiding campaign.  In addition to captured 
goods, the Chechens undertook an extensive hostage for ransom enterprise.131  All of 
these actions firmly reinforced the notion of Chechen banditry.132  
He also reinforced the label of Chechen bandit, in both Hobsbawm’s definition 
and that of the Russian and Soviet leaders.  Shamil forged the tribes together, through the 
combination of Islamic beliefs, personal charisma and force.  The fierce resistance 
Shamil and his fighters displayed reinforced a perception of the Chechens being 
incompatible with Russian society.  From this resistance, Shamil and his followers 
exhibited elements of what Hobsbawm referred to as social banditry, engaging in 
criminal acts under the auspices of protecting the oppressed.133  Shamil, or his myth, 
served as a rallying point and model for future Chechen resistance attempts.  It was the 
success of Shamil’s image as a resistance figure that produced a love-hate relationship 
throughout the final years of the empire and the Soviet period.134 
Continued resistance to Russian conquest would be the hallmark of Russo-
Chechen relations throughout the end of the empire.  It was this perception of criminality 
that was transferred to their Soviet successors; although historic Chechen resistance was 
overlooked in favor of the defeat of a common enemy, it soon became an issue.  As the 
Soviets broke one promise after another, the Chechen resistance was reborn.  These new 
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efforts reached back to the exploits of Shamil for moral support.135  Combined with the 
concept of “elements” and an expanded definition of banditry, the Soviets embarked 
upon a monumental application of population politics, culminating in the 1944 
deportation and exile of the Chechens. 
E. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MYTHICAL CHECHEN  
Over the course of the past 200 years, the myth of Chechen criminality and 
savagery has been constructed and re-constructed through two lenses: the physical 
interaction of conquest and resistance as well as literature.  Both of these lenses have 
often worked together in a mutually reinforcing manner, most effectively where the 
creators of the latter lens were participants in the former lens.  Early examples of this 
phenomenon are most evident in the writings of nineteenth century Russian authors, 
particularly the efforts of Lermontov, Pushkin and Tolstoy. 
Not only were all three authors significant literary figures they had personal 
experience in the Caucasus.  In addition to the personal experience all three authors lend 
to their works, the fact that they were prominent literary figures of their day added to 
both the credibility and circulation of their works.  The arrangement was not a supply 
driven situation, throughout the early to mid nineteenth century there was a growing 
demand for literature whose subject was the Asian regions of Russia.  This demand grew 
out of the blooming romantic era of Russian literature, an era that saw a significant 
increase in works focused on the North Caucasus.136  Popular literature was the 
nineteenth century equivalent of today’s mass media; it served to shape its reader’s 
understanding of their world.  The audience of Lermontov, Pushkin and Tolstoy were not 
just the intellectuals of Russia, but of the western world.  It was these intellectuals who 
influenced the course of events throughout the nineteenth century, and whose perceptions 
of the Caucasus were affected by a fictional and romanticized vision.   
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Aside from several academic expeditions dispatched to the Caucasus, Alexander 
Pushkin created one of the most influential works pertaining to the region.137  His poem 
“Captive of the Caucasus” sets to verse the contradictions resident within in the 
Caucasian tribes: nobility and savagery, honor and banditry.  In addition to portraying the 
duality of the Caucasian character he manages to contrast this nature against that of the 
Russian.  In the poem, a civilized Russian is captured by a savage mountaineer, in this 
case a Circassian, and taken to a remote village.  During his captivity, the Russian is 
attracted to the Circassian’s daughter, who eventually helps him to escape.  When the 
Russian explains that he will not return her love, she kills herself.138   
The poem appealed to a wide range of readers.  Its romantic core drew in readers 
who may not have been particularly interested in a story of a Caucasian mountaineer, 
while its detail of terrain and culture appealed to those students of the Caucasus.  The true 
impact revolved around the effort on Pushkin’s part to pass off his work as a “ground 
truth” vision of the Caucasus.139  This was despite the fact that the poem was written 
after a two-month trip to the spa resort at Piatigorsk.140  Pushkin’s limited experience and 
understanding of the region did not preclude his poem from becoming a source of study 
for those interested in the Caucasian region.141  Later, Pushkin would refer to the poem 
as, “an unsuccessful experiment with character over which he and his friends had quite a 
few laughs.”142  Despite Pushkin’s derision, many intellectuals of the nineteenth century 
conceptualized the Caucasus in terms Pushkin penned, specifically a mountain fortress 
manned by fierce mountaineers and beautiful women.143 
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While Pushkin created a vision of romance, adventure and most importantly 
freedom in the Caucasus, painting a picture of a noble bandit in every Caucasian, Mikhail 
Lermontov provided the more gritty reality unfolding in the Caucasus.  Having been 
forced to serve twice in the Caucasus campaigns, Lermontov saw the horrors of combat 
first hand.  His poetry spoke to the struggle between Russian expansion and the 
Caucasian, most likely Chechen, resistance.144  It was a struggle where neither side was 
wholly good, but again where the Chechens were portrayed as a noble savage.  The net 
effect was to solidify the motivations of freedom within the Chechens and the 
corresponding perception of their criminality among Russians.  Many Caucasians would 
later cite Lermontov, extolling the poet had indeed captured the essence of the struggle 
for freedom, “It was not a general before whom the Caucasus bowed, but the poetry of a 
young lieutenant.”145  
Leo Tolstoy furthered the works of Lermontov in as much as he continued to 
describe the savagery and ultimately the futility of the military campaign in the Caucasus.  
Like the preceding authors, Tolstoy focuses on martial skill, honor and the drive for 
freedom as defining the Caucasians.146  In his work Hadji Murat, Tolstoy recounts a 
series of betrayals and redemptions surrounding one of Shamil’s lieutenants, which 
ultimately ended in the main character’s valiant death.147  Tolstoy, at once praises Murat 
as a prime example of the noble savage while criminalizing Shamil for his cruel tactics.  
It was this drive for freedom that defined the Caucasian character along with willingness 
for violence and cruelty.  In the later years, the Russian leadership would attempt to play 
both sides of this dichotomy for their advantage.  For the remainder of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries, Moscow would attempt to rally supporters around 
those aspects of the “good” mountaineer, while demonizing those “bad” aspects.148 
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This attempt at manipulating the perceptions of both the Russian population and 
the Chechens was continued under the Soviets.  The most evident example relates to the 
changing portrayal of Shamil through the Soviet times.  In an attempt to garner the 
support of those Caucasian elements opposed to the Russian Empire the Bolsheviks took 
to defining some of Shamil’s undertaking, in the guise of national self determination, 
specifically stating that the Bolsheviks were not opposed to a Shariat state.149  Soviet 
support of Shamil and his resistance was gradually reduced as the Chechens increasingly 
resisted Soviet consolidation and collectivization.  This continued until the complete 
removal of Chechens and Chechnya from the Soviet official history after their 1944 
deportation.150  The Soviet efforts to criminalize, and then remove, the single most 
important figure in Chechen history was a significant step towards the criminalization of 
the entire identity.   
The myth of Chechen criminality did not stop with their removal from Soviet 
texts, it continued in the writings of new authors and among the Soviet social circles.  
After their release from exile in 1956, many Chechens migrated back to the Caucasus 
only to be confronted with new instances of anti-Chechen pogroms.  Chechens were 
persecuted for a number of charges, ranging from economic sabotage to terrorism.151  
Russian attempts at criminalization were likely manifestations of a systematic fear of the 
Chechens.  As a whole, the Chechens were generally considered a group that could not be 
cowed or controlled by Soviet officials, specifically because the Chechens did not fear 
the Soviet government.   
Alexander Solzhenitsyn points to this fact in his work Gulag Archipelago, 
recounting the defiance Chechens exhibited towards prison officials.152  This resistance 
to authority was the natural extension of two defining moments in the Chechen history:  
Shamil’s resistance and the deportation.  Chechen resistance and its subsequent 
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criminalization would not end with their release from exile. Chechen criminality would 
be perpetuated in the modern media and through official channels. 
Soviet law enforcement would play a significant role in the development and 
spread of the mythical Chechen criminal.  Law enforcement accomplished the spread of 
Chechen criminality in two ways: first, it continued a form of quasi-exile for Chechens 
throughout its territory by imposing a system of unequal laws, and second it propagated 
spurious reports of Chechen criminality to the media and foreign law enforcement 
agencies.  Unequal treatment of ethnic minorities by the Soviet law enforcement agencies 
is not unique to the Chechens at one time or another most minorities within the Soviet 
Union experienced some degree of disproportionate attention.  Anna Politkovskaya 
describes one such case in her work A Dirty War, where a Chechen, in complying with a 
city requirement to re-register was detained and then falsely accused, all stemming from 
his ethnicity.153  Chechens and the other North Caucasians served as a convenient 
internal enemy, one who was different and combative and evoked historic animosities.  
Soviet officials could play upon this public animosity and attribute criminal offenses to 
the Chechens.  This animosity would then be reinforced through the release of police 
reports indicting the Chechens to Soviet media sources.  Russian and international 
reporters, in search of a story that captures the attention of its readers would grasp onto 
these police reports and spread them as fact.154  Chechens as the villain and source of the 
ongoing economic and social woes experienced by Soviet and Russian society was likely 
an oddly reassuring concept and fit with an existing preconceived notion.  Demonizing 
the Chechens was not limited to the police and reporters, in a recreation of the works of 
Pushkin and Tolstoy; Chechens have reappeared in Russian cinema. 
Most of the Russian perceptions of Chechen criminality would be rooted directly 
or indirectly in two critical events in Chechen history.   These events galvanized the 
notion of what it means to be Chechen in the minds of both Russians and Chechens alike.  
Shamil’s resistance linked the Chechen identity to the act of resisting Moscow’s rule, at 
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once creating a rebel hero and a criminal in a single person.  The deportation served to 
unite all Chechens through a shared suffering; it further placed the Chechens on the 
outside of Soviet then Russian law and in effect criminalized the entire ethnicity. 
F. THE DEPORTATION OF 1944 
February 23, 1944, was not the first time Chechens had been subjected to forced 
relocation, but it was the most significant.  Almost since the beginning of the Russo-
Chechen relationship there has existed a policy on the part of Moscow to deport segments 
of the population that were perceived to be a threat.  Because of their continued violent 
resistance to central authority, the Chechens in varying numbers have been exiled.  
Interestingly, previous efforts at exile and savagery were centered on St. Petersburg’s 
concept of citizenship and a belief that the Chechens were incapable of conforming to 
this ideal.155   
While the motives behind the early relocations were likely, at least partially, 
influenced by the nineteenth century concepts of harmful societal “elements,” they may 
have also been influenced by the geopolitical situation of the era.  Russian desire to 
establish a buffer between the two neighboring Islamic empires and its own Muslim 
population, likely fueled the relocations.  Many of the relocations were undertaken during 
the middle of the century, in the midst of the attempt to secure the Caucasus interior.  
Leading thinkers of the time saw relocation, either forced or voluntary as the most 
permanent solution to the Chechen problem, as it placed a population of loyal citizens 
between the two Muslim populations.156  It turned out that this was a valid concern 
because tensions between the Ottoman Empire and Russia escalated culminating in the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877.  Ironically, in the preceding decade the Turkish government 
offered to resettle several thousand Chechen and Dagestani tribes, who would later play a 
role in the subsequent war.157  
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Deportation and exile continued to be practices employed by the powers in 
Moscow after the establishment of the Soviet Union.  Lenin and his followers supported 
the growth of titular nationalities during the initial push to consolidate their power.  
However, when nationalism began to threaten Soviet control, support was quickly 
withdrawn and replaced by mass criminalization.  Inclusive to the process was the mass 
criminalization of entire sections of the society, specifically those identified as kulaks. 
Through the 1920s, the Soviet economy went through a series of wild gyrations.  
As a result of the chaotic civil war and an overestimation of centralized economic 
control, there was a growing conflict between rural and urban populations.  In 1923, early 
efforts at the expansion of manufacturing produced an overabundance of manufactured 
goods and a lack of agriculture products, encouraging the peasants to keep their goods.  
In the following year, the process was reversed with a surplus of agriculture products and 
a dearth of manufactured goods.  The cycle began to stabilize during the final years of the 
decade until a new crisis erupted.  Agricultural production had fallen to the point where 
rural communities had to import grain for subsistence.158     
During the final years of the New Economic Program, the Soviet regime initiated 
criminal codes aimed at persecuting economic exploitation.  In 1927, article 107 
unleashed the secret police against the new entrepreneur class, nepmany.  This process 
would be repeated in the rural regions against the nepmany’s cousin, the kulak.  As early 
as the Party Congress of 1927, the idea of implementing a mass industrialization of 
agriculture had entered the political discussions.  Concurrent with this discussion was the 
demonization of rural entrepreneurs.  The kulak was painted as the cause of grain 
shortages in the cities, because he desired more profit.159   
Collectivization progressed with significant resistance throughout the rural Soviet 
Union.  Resistance and hardship increased with the artificially generated famines of the 
early 1930s.  Soviet military forces were dispatched throughout the land to quell peasant 
uprisings and forcible relocate peasants to the collective farms.  This process was 
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replicated in the North Caucasus, where “four infantry divisions, one rifle division, three 
artillery divisions and two regiments of mountain infantry were brought in to quell 
uprisings.”160 
In 1930, Chechen guerrillas engaged in a violent rebellion, waged mostly from the 
mountains and forests of Chechnya.  Heavy fighting continued for nearly a year until the 
Soviets offer of accommodation.  The accommodation turned out to be a deception, and 
35,000 Chechen fighters were arrested and subjected to punishments ranging from exile 
to death.  Chechen resistance to collectivization continued throughout the remainder of 
the decade.  By 1938, 490 collective farms had been established in Chechnya but all 
suffered from low productivity rates.  Soviet authorities continued to blame the lack of 
success in Chechnya, on the presence of “hostile class elements.”161  These hostile 
elements would continue to shape Soviet perceptions of the Chechens, and would lead to 
the criminalization of the entire Chechen population and their exile. 
As was pointed out previously, ideas and personnel central to the Soviet 
nationalities efforts were inherited from the tsarist state.  These individuals possessed not 
only grounding in the conduct of population politics, but an understanding of the event of 
the past hundred years in the Caucasus.  It was the combination of this understanding of 
recent history, the belief in the process of population politics and a concern of external 
forces that shaped the decision to conduct the 1944 deportation.  However, there were 
several significant differences between the 1944 deportation and the ones of the previous 
century.  Purpose and severity were the main differences of the two sets of deportations.  
In the previous occurrences, the deportations were undertaken as a preventative measure 
to improve the border security.  Even the deportations undertaken in response to 
collectivization were done for security reasons.  This was not the case in 1944 as the 
deportations were conducted after the threat, the German army, had departed.  In this case 
it appeared the deportations were undertaken for punitive reasons.162   
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In terms of severity, the deportations of 1944 were incomparable to previous 
iterations.  As the German military was withdrawing back west, Stalin acting through his 
representative Lavrentii Beria, issued orders for the removal of several suspect North 
Caucasus nationalities.  Planning for the operation began in late 1943 and was finalized 
in December, despite the legislative basis for the operation not being proposed until late 
January 1944.163  The title of the decree published by the State Committee for Defense 
“On the Liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and the Resettlement of the Chechens 
and Ingush in the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSRs” was both clinical and chilling.  Like many 
of the official action undertaken by Stalin, the majority of the planning and execution was 
accomplished in secret.  It was not until April 1944; well after the deportation had 
occurred that the operation was brought to the attention of the Supreme Soviet during a 
closed session.164 
As with the planning and approval, the movement of the NKVD force into the 
Chechen-Ingush ASSR was accomplished under a blanket of secrecy and deception.  The 
NKVD force assigned to conduct the operation arrived in late January dressed in Red 
Army uniforms under the pretense of a military training exercise.  In a stroke of evil 
genius, the force was billeted with Chechen and Ingush families instead of in field 
quarters.  This allowed the NKVD forces to familiarize themselves with the region as 
well as the people.165  It appears that the subterfuge was intended to preclude a general 
flight to the Chechen’s traditional mountain redoubts.  Soviet leaders surely did not want 
to repeat the battles of the 1850s or 1920s, whether or not they were facing a withdrawing 
Nazi army.  In any case, the operation was reportedly conducted with remarkable success. 
Beginning on 23 February, the NKVD force under the direction of Beria, began 
loading Chechen and Ingush families onto trucks for transport to designated railheads for 
further movement.  The following figures provide a reference to the swiftness and scale 
of the operation.  There were nearly 120,000 NKVD, NKGB, and Army personnel 
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involved in the operation.166  By the morning of 24 February, these forces had relocated 
333,379 Chechens and Ingush to “special collection points” and 176,950 of these had 
already been loaded on trains.167  By 1 March, the operation was nearly complete; the 
final figures would put the number deported at nearly 500,000.168 
It is hard to imagine a situation where the Chechens, who had to this point been a 
recalcitrant population, easy to anger and tied to both their freedom and the mountains, 
would meekly be loaded unto trains to be swept away to parts unknown.  One rational for 
the reportedly lack of violent opposition could be traced to the demographics of the area 
at the time of the deportation.  Most of the able-bodied men of fighting age were either 
conscripted into the Red Army or were fighting in anti-communist bands, in either case 
they were away from their homeland.169  This lack of men may be part of the reason for 
the decidedly low accounts of resistance.  Secondly, the manner in which the operation 
was carried out likely affected the level of violence.  By billeting a large number of 
soldiers throughout the region the Soviets were able to achieve operational and tactical 
surprise on the civilian population.  This surprise would have effectively eliminated any 
form of coordinated collective resistance by the population.  Thirdly, the NKVD 
reinforced the element of surprise with incidents of extreme violence, specifically 
regarding the portion of the population that fell into the “un-transportable” category.  
According to accounts, these individuals were routinely executed on the spot, as was the 
case of Khaibach on 27 February 1944.170  Official reports suggest that the consideration 
of prime importance was efficiency.  Beria, in his letters to Stalin, repeatedly cites 
numbers of deportees in relation to time frame.171 
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Khaibach is not the only place where eyewitness accounts diverged from the 
clinical official reports.  Elsewhere there remains a discrepancy between official accounts 
and the surviving eyewitness reports that underscores the brutality of the deportation. 
There appears to be little concern for the anything outside of maintaining the schedule.  
Collection operations were done with an emphasis on speed, resulting in the Chechens 
departing with only the close on their backs and possibly a handful of portable 
possession.  In many cases, the emphasis on efficiency resulted in families being 
separated at the point of collection never to be reunited.172  
It was not only at the point of collection that official accounts differed regarding 
the treatment of the “special settlers,” accounts of the transportation and the settlement 
conditions diverged.  Official instructions regarding the requirements of the rail cars 
provide one such example.  Beria had issued instructions that: 
2.c.) Each wagon must be equipped for human transportation, it must have 
bunk beds, a stove, and other necessary objects. 
3) Food for deportees is to be provided by the commandant of the train at 
specially allotted points along the line of march.  A doctor and two nurses 
are to be assigned to each train with the necessary medicaments and 
instruments.173 
Logistical preparations were based upon population estimates, from these it was 
calculated that each train would be required to transport and average of 2740 people.174  
It seems unlikely that during the war there would be sufficient medical personnel or 
equipment diverted from the military and applied to a rebellious population.  
Additionally, it is unlikely that in a time where food was a premium it would be diverted 
in sufficient quantities to support the relocation effort.  The official policy was modified 
during the execution of the deportation; NKVD officials did away with baggage cars, 
owing to the fact that the Chechens were not allowed to depart with any substantial 
amount of baggage.  Concurrent with re-missioning the train carriages, additional people 
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were loaded onto each car, since “To increase the shipment of the special contingent from 
40 to 45 by packing more into the wagon is entirely appropriate given the presence of a 
proportion of 40 to 50 per cent of children in the special contingent.”175   
Hardship, humiliation, and violence continued during the transportation.  Little 
was officially reported regarding the food or heating in the trains during the shipment, but 
it is generally accepted that both were in short supply.  The facilities described in Beria’s 
instruction were generally absent, men women and children huddled together for warmth 
during the nearly month long trip.  Owing to a lack of latrines they were forced to carve 
holes in the floors of the train and share its use, an enormously embarrassing act in 
Chechen culture.176  Disease was common among the trains and caused the deaths of an 
unknown percentage of the deportees.  The deportees buried the dead alongside the rail 
line; these impromptu graveyards were within a stone’s throw of the train because anyone 
venturing more than five meters from the train was shot for fear of escaping.177 
Conditions failed to improve upon arrival to the “special settlements” this is not 
surprising as these camps were administered by the GULAG until 1944.178  Special 
settlements were not unique to the ethnic deportations of 1943 and 1944, they had been in 
existence since at least 1929 and used in conjunction with the Soviet de-Kulakization.  
The camps were not necessarily the same as those in Kolyma and Magadan, often the 
special settlers worked alongside locals; it was only in terms of their rights significant 
variations were noted.179  Hussein, the central figure in Thomas Goltz’s book “Chechen 
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Diary” illustrates this point, born in Kazakhstan, he and his fellow Chechens managed to 
carve out a successful niche in the community but only after their 1956 rehabilitation.180 
Aside from the relative proximity to the local population, Chechens might as well 
have been on another world.  Significant restrictions were imposed upon them; they were 
subjected to additional monitoring or “special accounting” meaning the requirement to 
register with the local NKVD/MVD office.  Their movements were restricted to within 
three kilometers of their residence.  A continual lack of food and medicine contributed to 
a soaring mortality rate.  Famine was frequently a problem for the Chechens; the meager 
food shipments arranged by the Soviets were often siphoned off by locals and 
administrators.  The lack of proper clothing aided to the overall miserable condition, to 
such a point that the head of the Department of Special Settlements, M.V. Kuznetsov 
remarked on the effect on North Caucasian ability to be used as part of the labor force.181 
The material conditions of the Chechens in exile led to an overall decrease in the 
total population.  The material conditions were further exacerbated by the 1948 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decree, which officially criminalized the Chechens and 
other deportees of the “Great Patriotic War.”  The decree clarified the duration of the 
exile and its consequences, the duration was for life, and the consequences were 20 years 
in the GULAG for any attempted escape.182  If there had been any doubt about the 
criminality of the Chechens this decree put that doubt to rest. 
February 23, 1944, would forever be a defining moment in the lives of the 
Chechens.  Its memory was passed down from generation to generation, so that even the 
youngest Chechen is cognizant of the experience.  The experience of the deportation 
produced two effects relative to the criminalization of the Chechens; it untied the 
population and officially criminalized it.  Events with the level of brutality and violence, 
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such as the 1944 deportation and the subsequent exile, leave a lasting impression; one 
only has to look south at the Armenian-Turkish relationship to see a similar regional 
experience.  For the Chechens, the deportations would solidify their concept of self, as 
one apart from their Russian countrymen and one that was decidedly criminal. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The concept of Chechen criminality is not the product of one era or another.  The 
notion has grown throughout the entire course of interaction between the Russians and 
the Chechens.  It is a combination of action and reaction on the part of both Russians and 
Chechens.  It has been crystallized through two significant events, Shamil’s resistance 
and the deportation.  Running through the entire history has been the growth of a 
Chechen mythology, focusing on resistance to authority, and participation in criminal or 
perceived criminal acts.  In the end the myth produced a belief inside Russia and outside 
of the existence of a violent and expansive ethnic organized crime group.  While there are 
elements of truth to the notion of Chechen criminality, its pervasiveness was uniformly 
exaggerated.  Not all Chechens were criminals in the strictest sense, although it would be 
false to say that there was not an influential criminal element within the Chechen 




IV. CHECHEN MAFIA: THE GENESIS 
They had a strong clan system, based on family ties…Every Chechen 
youth was taught to obey and respect his elders and distrust outsiders.  
They were also addicted to firearms as a way of settling disputes or merely 
demonstrating prowess…They seemed to me very similar to the Sicilian 
mafia…When the Chechens were finally permitted to return after the war, 
they discovered that their best land had been occupied by strangers.  What 
else could many of them do but turn to crime?  It was a logical step to turn 
their clans into criminal groups. —Capt Yuri Nikishin, Moscow Police 
Organized Crime Squad183 
Chechen involvement in organized crime has been at once, a central aspect of 
their culture and a product of evolutionary interaction with Russian and Soviet forces.  In 
previous sections, we have explored the process of both forming a Chechen proto-state 
and the “criminalization” of the Chechen identity.  Integral to each process was the 
interplay between the expanding power of Moscow and the resilience of local Chechen 
practices. When the two came into contact, a process of control and resistance was 
initiated.  It was through this struggle, that the foundation was laid for the later 
development of a uniquely Chechen criminal “underworld.”  At first, the criminal 
activities of the Chechens were limited to the immediate surroundings of their tribal 
lands.  However, this changed significantly during the Soviet era with the expansion of 
the Soviet prison system and the 1944 deportation.  These two instances combined with 
the unique economic situation in the Soviet Union ultimately facilitated the establishment 
of a robust network of Chechen criminal organizations.    
This section will discuss the genesis of a unique ethnically based organized crime 
group comprised of individuals from Chechnya.  Through out the long interaction 
between Chechens and Russians, the phenomenon of organized criminality has been 
saddled with a series of labels ranging from bandits to terrorists.  Aside from the 
persistent label of bandits, the most persistent moniker of recent years has been “mafia.”  
There have been attempts in law enforcement and media circles to categorize the criminal 
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groups in Russia’s 1990s as mafias or a mafia.  It is therefore necessary to discuss briefly 
the history of crime in Russia and the Soviet Union then address the concept of a Russian 
mafia before focusing on the Chechen variety. 
A. ROOTS OF THE RUSSIAN RURAL CRIME 
Russian social and political workings have always been an area of confusion for 
outside observers.  This has been the case from the beginning of Muscovite interactions 
with Western and continues to be true today.  Edward Keenan attributes the lack of 
clarity to a mixture of cultural and environmental factors, the sum of which leads 
Russians to deliberately obscure the workings of their society.184  Avoiding the debate of 
the actual role of cultural and environmental factors, it is reasonable to view Russian 
societal forces as strange and largely incomprehensible to foreign observers.  For most 
western observers the strangeness of Russian traditions and political structure likely 
affected their ability to fully conceptualize the overt workings of the society.  In his work, 
Marquis de Custine identifies and attempts to describe the inner workings of Russian 
society expounding upon the foundation laid by earlier travelers.185  In doing so, he 
incorporates and perpetuates observations of previous travelers regarding the convoluted 
nature of Russian politics.186  If confusion exists regarding the government, a largely 
overt structure, then little can be expected for a definitive analysis of the early criminal 
working in Russia. 
Joseph Serio has undertaken an effort to shed some light on the early Russian 
criminal situation.  Approaching the task from an oblique angle, Serio analyzes the 
experiences of early businessmen in Russia.  Beginning with the interaction between Tsar 
Ivan IV and an English trader Richard Chancellor, Serio draws a sketch of a string of 
                                                 
184 Edward L. Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways” The Russian Review 45 (1986), 115–181. 
185 Irena G. Gross, “The Tangled Tradition: Custine, Herberstein, Karamzin, and the Critique of 
Russia” Slavic Review 50 (1991), 991.  Gross notes de Custine likely did not read the works of all previous 
writers as some had yet to be translated into French, however he draw upon their concepts of Russian social 
structure. 
186 Irena G. Gross, “The Tangled Tradition: Custine, Herbertstein, Karamzin, and the Critique of 
Russia, 992. Two prominent authors of early Muscovite society Siegmund von Herberstein and Giles 
Fletcher noted the criminality of Muscovite society.  
 63 
repressive tsars, corrupt bureaucrats and extensive smuggling which in the end stymied 
foreign business efforts.  Despite his bleak portrayal of early business effort, little is 
discussed concerning sixteenth and seventeenth century crime.  The only source is a 
MVD document citing “villages of bandits” who acting in accordance with Hobsbawm’s 
social bandit, fought and robbed for the freedom the seventeenth peasantry.187 
Outside understanding of criminality from the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
is better than that of the preceding era.  This increase in understanding is likely due to the 
attempts by Peter the Great, and the subsequent tsars and tsarinas, to open Russia to the 
West.  It was during this time that travelers, such as de Custine, make their journeys and 
from their accounts; we are able to piece together an idea of the criminal world in Russia.  
Travelers commented on the pervasive criminality of Moscow in the eighteenth century, 
noting the prevalence of Russian thugs, armed beggars, and thieves.188  Some of these 
criminals were even reported to have developed an organizational structure, including 
initiation rites and a criminal jargon, that some point to as an early form of organized 
crime.189   
Groups of criminal were not only present in the urban areas but also throughout 
the remainder of the growing empire.  Engaging in theft and extortion of travelers and 
peasants alike Russian rural criminals fit neatly into the broad framework of bandits 
espoused by Eric Hobsbawm.190  Banditry in rural Russia was for the most part a local 
and personal activity; the bandits did not normally travel searching out victims instead 
opting to exploit those closest to them.  However, there was an evolutionary process to 
the phenomena, whereby more wealthy peasants began to hire certain bandit elements for 
protection.  Those groups who were more organized and powerful were naturally more 
successful191   
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Concurrent with the process of exploitation and protection by groups of bandits 
was the contest over political control of the countryside.  As Moscow expanded outward, 
its expeditionary elements, both administrative and military, were brought into contact 
and conflict with the existing bandit groups.  This initial contact started a contest of 
control over who possessed the legitimate right to extract resources from the population.  
Rural administrators, like their bandit counterparts, demanded subsistence from the 
peasants, in the form of material and labor.  These resources were often taken by means 
of coercion and from the perspective of the peasant, it was hard to discriminate between 
the two groups.192  
Gradually through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian 
government grew in capability.  It was more able to monopolize the use of force through 
a larger military.  Its administrative structures were developed into a complex and if not 
perfect then a functioning bureaucracy.  Through the process of cooption, inclusion and 
combat it was able to push the frontiers farther out.  Despite the success in pushing the 
frontiers farther away from the core, there were still ample areas where rural crime 
continued, owing to a lack of effective oversight on the bureaucracy.  Through much of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, wages among the administrators were low, and 
their ratio to the citizenry was also low.  The two factors led to an almost habitual 
adoption of graft and corruption.193   
It was in this environment that the Russians encountered the Chechen tribes. The 
Chechens were one of many frontier societies whose survival required an element of 
banditry, specifically raiding the more agrarian communities and military units located in 
the Caucasian foothills.  Life on the frontier was a mix of cooperation and conflict.  Both 
sides were forced to trade with each other for basic necessities.  Some contend that the 
formation of the line of forts spurred contact between Imperial Russia and Caucasians.194   
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For the Chechens, who were among the last to resist Russian expansion, this 
provided a foundation of the dualism that would characterize their subsequent 
relationship with Russian society.  Even in the bloody First Chechen War, there was 
evidence of trade between the Russian military and Chechen rebels; surprisingly the 
items traded were weapons and the currency was dollars.195  Vicious raids punctuated the 
trade by both sides, for the purpose of acquiring some material possession or to meet out 
punishment.  However, the raids did little to stifle interaction.  Moritz Wagner noted in 
the 1840s, “It was often a normal state of affairs…daily interaction between men and 
women who, a few nights before or after, might have found themselves on opposite sides 
of a military clash.”196 
Chechen criminality throughout much of this period was linked to their resistance 
to the expansion of Russian power.  Raiding was a means of not only survival but also 
resistance. Chechen have long been idealized as the personification of resistance to 
outside oppression.  This perception has been attributed to both, the relative size of the 
Chechen population and their consistent vigorous resistance to Russian rule.197  This 
distinction was earned before the first Russian soldier entered into Caucasus Mountains.  
Chechen reputation was built upon daring and skilled raids into Russian controlled 
territories capturing livestock, hostages and women for slaves.198  
This does not automatically place the Chechens into Hobsbawm’s category of 
social banditry.  For one the Chechens are based on a tribal structure that raid as a means 
of substance, this arrangement is expressly excluded from Hobsbawm’s argument.199  
Being an egalitarian structure the Chechens lack an internal hierarchy that places the 
bandit in the role of social hero.  Even taken in a broader perspective, where Chechens 
and Russians were elements of a single community, actors such as Shamil exist outside of 
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the concept of a social bandit.  Shamil raided the Russians but not as a means of social 
protest, his raids generally had a military purpose.  They were aimed either at weakening 
a Russian military force or capturing needed supplies, not to redress the grievance of the 
Chechen tribesman. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the state of Russian crime can be 
broken into several generalized categories.  Urban centers were experiencing relatively 
high rates of crime centered on armed assaults and petty crimes, despite fairly draconian 
governmental policies.  In the rural areas, elements of organized banditry continued but 
this was increasingly suppressed through military means.  In both urban and rural settings 
corruption and low pay thwarted the establishment of effective police organizations.200  
This lack of pervasive law enforcement forced rural inhabitants to police themselves.201   
The events of the First World War and the following revolution had a dramatic 
affect upon Russian society.  It increased the causes of criminality through a lack of 
resources and security.  Because of the dislocation of a significant portion of the rural 
population, there was an increase in the surplus of willing criminals.  In an effort to 
consolidate political control, the Bolsheviks expanded their internal police structures and 
the prison system.202  The expansion of the policing and penal institutions was significant 
but so to was the change in the concept of criminality.  In the tsarist era criminals were 
generally still members of society but operating outside of the bounds of the law.  They 
possessed institutions that would serve as the basis for Soviet era organized crime.  In the 
Soviet era these criminals were no longer simply operating outside of law they were 
effectively outside of society.203  This shift in perspective was likely a byproduct of the 
Soviet extension of thinking that they could isolate, and then extract harmful elements of 
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society, to facilitate greater central control and an earthly utopia.204  Tanya Frisby 
summarizes this situation most succinctly:   
The traditional criminal fraternity in the Soviet Union dates its formation 
from the end of the Civil War, when poverty, hunger, destitution and 
homelessness, especially among children and young people, were 
overwhelming.  Crime was the only way of survival for these people.  The 
majority of them, despite the state’s rehabilitation efforts, entered the 
criminal world as professional robbers and thieves by the time of NEP.  
The tightening of the political order in the late 1920s also brought waves 
of arrests of criminal gangs and their leaders.  They often shared prison 
cells and camp barracks with the political prisoners whose numbers were 
growing even more rapidly.205 
It was precisely this period of time, that that saw an increase in the number of 
Chechens in the Soviet penal system, as a mixture of political and criminal inmates.  
Owing to their staunch resistance to Soviet authority the Chechens would have naturally 
gravitated to the values espoused by the growing organized criminal world, or thieves’ 
world.  The early years of the Soviet regime were most significant for the formation of 
the thieves world and it was the structure of this “world” that provided form to 
subsequent organized crime in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia.  
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE THIEVES’ WORLD 
Life in the Soviet Union was analogous to living in a police state.  Despite its 
characterization as a totalitarian state, control within the Soviet Union was never total.  
Soviet leadership was still able to maintain a degree of civil control even without total 
control over the territory.206  Control in the Soviet state was accomplished through the 
“massive and arbitrary use of terror an imprisonment.”207  It was through the efforts of 
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the various security services that such terror was enacted.  The expansive network of 
informers served to expand the capability of the security services, while breaking down 
the interpersonal support networks, as it was possible for anyone to be an informer.208  
In the interstitial spaces, elements of the grey and black economies began to grow.  
Harsh conditions faced by the most deprived elements of society pushed them towards 
criminality for survival.  As a whole, the Russian population faced such conditions during 
and immediately after the Civil War, but for the Chechens these conditions continued 
until the present.209  There were significant ramifications of life in such a country.  State 
survival was often linked to the presence of real or manufactured enemies.  Chechens 
with their continued resistance to Soviet powers served the role of state enemy quite well 
and as such often ended up in prison.  
Harsh conditions and the manufacture of state threats were characteristics of the 
Soviet Union, as the state began to re-exert it control over the territory and suppress rival 
power centers, with the natural byproduct of an increased prison population.210   
As mentioned above, toward the end of the tsarist era criminal society had begun 
to form its own societal structures.  These social structures were both representative of 
the larger Russian society and uniquely different.  Throughout the region, like in the law-
abiding version, criminals had organized themselves into mutually supportive 
communities.211  Each of the communities had developed groups that specialized in 
certain variations of crime, ranging from horse theft to burglary.212  They developed a 
rudimentary hierarchy as well as a robust language and system of symbols, expressed 
through tattoos.  Most if not all of these characteristics survived the revolution and were  
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expanded upon in the Soviet prison system.213  It was through the thieves’ world and the 
thief-in-law that the traditions were passed along through generations of Soviet 
prisoners.214 
Between the 1920s and 1950s, the thieves’ world developed a strict code of 
conduct for its members.  This code regulated the actions of its members as well as 
proscribing acceptable interaction with members outside of the thieves’ world.  Members 
spoke in a complex language, comprised of an amalgamation of Romany, Yiddish and 
other slang.  They sported a complex array of tattoos, which served as a criminal version 
of the curriculum vitae.  While there was no single authoritative member the thieves 
governed themselves through a series of councils composed of the most senior members 
of the society, the thieves-in-law.  Central to the system, was the steadfast refusal to 
interact with the society outside of the thieves’ world, both within and without of the 
prison system.  One could steal from outside but never cooperate or receive favors from 
members of legitimate societies, to do so would bring shame and punishment.215 
Soviet era prison authors, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Varlam Shalamov, 
describe aspects of the thieves’ world and its members.  Solzhenitsyn noted, “to them 
prison is their native home” referring to members of the thieves’ world and their rejection 
of society.  Varlam Shalamov adds his own observation of the conduct of the members of 
the thieves’ world in several of his short stories.  Shalamov illustrates the manner by 
which the thieves survived in his story “On Tick.”  In the story, a thief and one of the 
guards play cards for the possessions of another inmate.  The thief consistently wins 
amassing the possessions of the guard and an inmate, ultimately resulting in the inmate’s 
death, after which the thief casually departs.216 
The ideal of the thieves’ world began to break down during the 1940s for a 
combination of factors, the most significant of which was a change in the demographics 
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and size of the prison population.  Through the 1940s, there was an initial decrease in 
prison population largely resulting from the formation of penal battalions; however, this 
did not last long. Between 1944 and 1946, the prison population rose 40 percent from 1.4 
million to 1.7 million inmates. The trend continued until 1953, when the population of 
Soviet prisons peaked at 2.45 million inmates.217  The demographic make-up of the 
inmates changed as well during this timeframe.  There was an increase in the percentage 
of repressed nationalities, to include the Chechens.218 
One of the byproducts of the increase in the size and diversity of the prison 
population was a corresponding increase in the difficulty to manage it.  In the larger 
context, the prison system was divided into criminals and political prisoners.  The 
criminal portion was further divided into members of the thieves’ world and ‘renegades’ 
or ‘bitches’.219  In an effort to manage the growing political prisoner population, the 
GULAG officials turned to criminal members outside of the thieves’ world to manage the 
daily operations.220   
Varlam Shalamov describes such an arrangement in his short story “My First 
Tooth.”221  This story depicts a criminal overseer who knocks out one of Shalamov’s 
protagonist’s teeth as punishment for a minor infraction of the prison rules.  What 
Shalamov described was likely the interaction between a ‘renegade’ and a political 
prisoner.  The arrangement described by Shalamov would not have occurred between a 
member of the thieves’ world and a political prisoner for the simple fact that no thief 
would have collaborated with the officials in running the camp.   
It was this collaboration that brought the thieves’ world to near extinction.  It 
began with the return of inmates many former members of the thieves’ world who had 
served in the Red Army.  Many of these returning criminals attempted to reenter the 
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ranks of the thieves’ world but were barred and labeled traitors or bitches.  The conflict 
quickly escalated into a battle to the death throughout the prison system.222  In the five 
years of the fighting, later to be know as the Scab War, nearly all the traditional thieves-
in-law were killed.223  It was at the brink of oblivion that, “a peculiar phenomenon 
occurred: ordinary criminals began to sympathize with the traditional thieves-in-law” and 
a myth was born.224  This sympathy allowed their code survived although in a modified 
form.  
The new members of the thieves’ world had a more expansive view of the field of 
criminal endeavors.  They were no longer limited to crimes that could be conducted 
within the prison system or the more traditional pastimes. The new criminal element was 
characterized as generally more flexible in though, possessing better intelligence 
collection methods and a more astute judge of character.225  Cooperation with 
government officials was now permissible under the new framework, this would further 
the possibility of crimes outside of the penal system, especially during the increasingly 
corrupt Brezhnev era.226 
C. CHECHENS ENTER THE THIEVES’ WORLD 
It was during the final stages of the traditional thieves’ world and the beginning of 
its new iteration that the Chechens arrived to the prisons in large numbers.  This was 
primarily due to the deportation of 1944, where many Chechen males ended up in the 
prison system.  As an ethnicity, the Chechens continued their resistance to Soviet 
authority.  Alexander Solzhenitsyn commented on the Chechen’s resistance, “Only one 
nation refused to accept the psychology of submission …The Chechens.”227  As further 
evidence of the intractability of the Chechens, Vanora Bennett cites a GULAG returnee, 
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“sometimes (they) would try to split up families or take away our rights…but then they’d 
be found dead on the highway…and after a while they learned to treat us with 
respect.”228 
Bound together by ethnic bonds, and possessing a more than healthy dose of 
animosity toward the Soviet leadership, involvement in a criminal network was likely a 
perfect fit for the eternal Chechen underdog rebel.  As members of this new criminal 
fraternity the Chechens were brought into contact with other members of the Soviet 
criminal world.  These relationships would prove to be beneficial when the population of 
the GULAG was reduced in conjunction with Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization efforts.229   
In the 1970s, with the Soviet economy self-destructing and the demand for 
consumer goods increasing, there existed an ideal situation for a disciplined criminal 
organization to thrive.  In response to consumer demands, black markets steadily 
expanded.  In addition to the growth of black markets, a shadow economy sprang into 
existence.  The shadow economy consisted of consumer goods created from stolen state 
resources.  The shadow businessmen lacked protection and a means to bring their goods 
to market, enter the professional criminals.230  In addition to distribution and protection 
the nascent businessmen needed a mechanism to arbitrate disputes and enforce 
contracts.231  Both tasks were tailor made for members of the thieves’ world, as they had 
been doing it for the past fifty years.  Arrangements were made as early as the 1950s, and 
expanded in the early 1980s, for the merger of soon to be oligarchs and organized crime 
elements, of which the Chechens were one.232 
                                                 
228 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 199. 
229 Tanya Frisby, "The Rise of Organized Crime in Russia: Its Roots and Social Significance,” 33. 
230 Tanya Frisby, "The Rise of Organized Crime in Russia: Its Roots and Social Significance,” 33. 
231 Misha Glenny, McMafia, 59. 
232 Katya Vladimirov, “Red Buccaneers: Soviet Criminal Enterprises, 1950s” Canadian-American 
Slavic Studies 35 (2001): 267–277.  In her article “Red Buccaneers: Soviet Criminal Enterprises, 1950s” 
Katya Vladimirov traces the intertwined relationship of corrupt managers of the burgeoning “shadow 
economy” and the traditional organized criminals back to the 1950s.  It would appear that while the 
arrangements may have dated back this far they were limited in scope.  Not until the culmination of the 
Scab Wars would there have been the necessary shift in the leadership of the thieves’ world to facilitate the 
cooperation with any form of authority figure.   
 73 
Owing to their situation in the wake of the 1944 deportation, the Chechen 
community possessed several attributes that allowed them to succeed in Soviet organized 
crime.  The deportation left an indelible mark on every Chechen until the present, serving 
to unite them as one people.233  Chechen nationalism was forged under some of the most 
arduous conditions, not entirely unlike those that served to crystallize Armenian and 
Jewish identities.  There was a second unintended effect of the relocation of Chechens.  
By spreading the Chechen population throughout Central Asia and Siberia, Stalin created 
a scattered network of ethnic enclaves.234  Continued demonization by mainstream 
Russian society, served to further isolate the Chechens, forcing them to turn further 
inward to the exclusion of Soviet society.  By the end of 1994, only one sixth of those 
Chechen families deported in 1944 had been given permanent housing.235  Chechens as a 
whole continued to resist Stalin’s ‘socialist culture’, to the point that assimilation into 
Soviet society was nearly impossible.236   
Barred from entry into legitimate Soviet society and forced to endure extreme 
hardship, Chechens had no option but to increase their self-reliance and turn to crime as a 
means of survival.237  The fact that crime, as defined by the Soviet system, did not carry 
the same social stigma within Chechen society does not lessen their act of social protest.  
In a real life debate between Hobsbawm and Blok, the Chechens acted as a foil to a series 
of Soviet rulers, but were only able to do so with the assistance of corrupt bureaucrats.238    
After Stalin’s death, many of the restrictions imposed on the deported were 
gradually lifted.  Slowly the state acknowledged the flow of illegal migration back to 
Chechnya.  This migration generally coincided with Khrushchev’s denunciation of 
Stalin’s excesses. What started as a small flow in 1954, resulted in a massive rush by 
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1959 remapping the demographic make-up of Chechnya.239  Many of those deported 
returned to a radically different homeland.  The mass return did not equate to all 
Chechens, many remained in their deported locations while others continually gravitated 
to the growing Russian cities.240  Those that did return home were often subjected to 
forced seasonal migration in support of Soviet agriculture efforts.241 
Those Chechens who ended up in large Russian cities were often confined to 
ethnic slums.  Situations not unlike those of immigrants to America led to the 
development of unique ethnic enclaves, supported by an ethnic self-help system.  The 
presence of an ethnic group in a given city would in turn provide a pull for others to 
migrate in search of work.  The reciprocal forces of forced migration and an ethnic pull 
further spread the Chechen population throughout the Soviet Union.  The self-help 
mentality fostered the generation of ethnic gangs for the express purpose of protecting 
ethnic interests.242 
Chechen criminal elements had exploited gaps in the Soviet system to the greatest 
extent possible; maximizing adversities experienced by their ethnicity and taking social 
isolation and ethnic solidarity in the only direction possible, into a wider criminal 
endeavor.  The Chechens were uniquely postured to take advantage of the chaotic 
environment of the Russian 1990s.  With established ethnic populations in the major 
Russian and Central Asian cities, linked together by a common ethnic bond, Chechen 
gangs were able to offer services that Russia could not.  In many cases, the Chechens 
were able to straddle the gap between the legitimate and illegitimate Russia, due in part to 
the Soviet affirmative action programs.  With influence across the region and a reputation 
                                                 
239 Svante E Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 202 
240 Svante E Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 203 
241 Svante E Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 203 
242 Ryan Gingeras, "Russia: Origins of the Red Godfathers." (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, September 8, 2010). 
 75 
for loyalty and violence, it is no wonder rising oligarchs such as Boris Berezovsky turned 
to the Chechens to help further his economic endeavors.243 
D. FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RISE OF ORGANIZED 
CRIME 
Social and economic conditions continued to deteriorate in the Soviet Union 
through the 1980s.  A highly centralized economy, in which Moscow controlled, or 
thought they controlled, all fields of human endeavor proved incapable of competing in a 
global free-market.  In response to an ever-decreasing supply of consumer goods, 
enterprising organizations contributed to a growing grey and black economy.  Money 
played a minor role within this economic structure, those organizations that could 
facilitate the acquisition and transportation of tangible commodities gained prominence, 
the Chechens were one such group.244 
As the old social structure rapidly eroded, Russian citizens relied more upon 
interpersonal bonds and established relationships for stability and security.245  Frisby 
notes that the growth of the free market system in Russia served to undermine 
interpersonal relationships, replacing collective support with self-interest.246  The 
thieves’ world was not immune to this phenomenon; the code that governed their world 
even in its adapted form was gradually supplanted for with the quest for personal 
wealth.247  The Chechen community was one of the few to successfully maintain 
collective support  
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within a free-market economy.  Local Chechen gangs retained their ethnic identity and 
connections with other Chechen gangs, in a network of mutually beneficial 
arrangements.248   
The Soviet system of criminal justice was insufficient to address the evolving 
nature of crime throughout the country.  The state could no longer resort to deporting or 
incarcerating entire sections of the population as a means of control.249  The spread of a 
market economy was concurrent with new activities that were formerly not considered to 
be criminal, mainly because they had no place in the Soviet command economy.  Legal 
and administrative regulations were not sufficiently adaptive to deal with the evolving 
social and economic developments, mainly because the problems now arising were 
outside the conception of most of the Russian bureaucracy.  Combined with an inflexible 
legal system, the hyperinflation of the 1990s decreased the ability and desire of law 
enforcement agencies at all levels to effectively address the changing security 
environment.250  Corruption, which was always a present factor in Russia, rose during 
this period and resulted in the siphoning of operating funds from law enforcement 
agencies into the pockets of police leadership.251  Growing violence also affected law 
enforcement personnel’s decision on what crimes to investigate.  Those crimes with a 
higher probability of solution and a low level of personal risk were generally pursued, 
often to the benefit of growing organized criminal groups.252 
As official law enforcement organizations continued to atrophy, Russian citizens 
increasingly turned to criminals for resolution, marking the rapid rise of the, gruppirovki, 
(street gang).253  The growth of these organizations, of which the Chechens were the 
most feared, was exponential between 1991 and 1996.  This was primarily due to the fact 
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that the state effectively relinquished their monopoly on violence through absence.254  
Three major elements were becoming increasingly connected; corrupt Russian 
bureaucracy, wealthy oligarchs and powerful organized crime groups.  Through the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation, the bureaucracy 
remained intact but riddled with corruption and largely powerless.  The oligarchs relying 
on position, charm and intelligence continued to fleece state resources while growing 
more wealthy and influential.  The groups of organized criminals provided a relatively 
secure environment and dispute resolution services necessary in a market without 
effective legal strictures.255  
 Gorbachev’s 1988 policy of cooperatives codified the birth of a new capitalist 
class.  In practice this policy did little more than bring to light existing grey market 
practices; letting communist directors who had access to state resources to turn their 
position into more tangible assets, primarily in the form of U.S. dollars.256   
Aggressive competition was the theme through the 1990s.  In this chaotic 
capitalist free-for-all rising oligarchs were often more concerned with competing 
oligarchs.  They feared the treachery of competitors, and in some cases allies, more than 
they feared the growing organized criminals.257  These calculations combined with the 
need for a “roof” strengthened the oligarch/criminal arrangements. 
A reliable “roof” was critical for an emerging entrepreneur.  In many cases a 
businessman was willing to pay up to 30 percent of his profits for an effective “roof.”  In 
exchange for the pay, street gangs would ensure the businessman could continue to 
operate free from the influence of rival competitors or criminal interference.  The 
effectiveness of the “roof” deepened upon the leadership of the group providing it, not all 
were equal to the challenge of operating in an evolving capitalist Russia.258  It was not 
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only the growing organized crime elements that provided a “roof” law enforcement 
personnel would also serve this function often forming joint roofs with criminal 
elements.259  Again, the Chechens with countrywide connections, deep loyalty and a 
capacity for ruthlessness rose to the top.  Rival street gangs and businessmen alike 
respected the Chechen reputation for fearlessness and violence.260 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between businessmen, 
corrupt officials and organized crime deepened.  Each element was growing more 
powerful in political terms but more significantly in economic terms.   The rising 
oligarchs needed the protection of the gangsters to make and then retain their wealth, in 
turn the criminals flourished.261  As Glenny notes, “the richer the oligarch, the bigger and 
wealthier his protectors—mutually assured wealth creation.”262  Chechen organized 
crime elements were prevalent within this arrangement providing protection to wealthy 
but they had other business interests as well. 
In the late 1980s, reports of Chechen involvement in auto dealerships were 
surfacing.  Violent conflict had opened between Chechen groups and at least two Slavic 
organized crime groups, the Lyubers and the Solntsevo.263  The auto dealerships in 
dispute were allegedly tied to Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky.  In an effort to work 
out the arrangement, the groups had a ‘conversation’ outside a Logovaz showroom 
resulting in the death of six Chechens and four Russians.264  For the Chechens, there was 
a significant financial interest at stake, protecting auto dealerships had transitioned into 
selling and transporting stolen or appropriated vehicles.  This trade in part boosted the 
Chechens to one of the wealthiest criminal groups in Moscow.265 
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Trafficking in stolen vehicle was a good source of revenue for the Chechen 
groups, but in the 1990s, they moved into other more lucrative activities.  Chechen 
involvement in drug trafficking particularly narcotics emerged in the 1990s and provided 
a significant source of income for Chechen criminal groups.  Taking advantage of 
Chechens communities throughout the Russia and corrupt officials, criminal groups were 
able to extend their narcotics across the country.266  
Drug trafficking was augmented by weapons trafficking much of which was 
facilitated through a collaboration between organized crime groups and Russian military 
personnel.  A significant portion of the weapons entering the black market originated 
from the Trans-Caucasus Military District.267  Again, Chechen organized crime elements 
capitalized upon their unique combination of attributes, close-knit communities, extra-
legal existence and proximity to an enormous source of weapons.  Almost anything was 
for sale in the early 90s, Thomas Goltz reports experiencing a Chechen arms bizarre on a 
trip to Grozny, where merchants hawked anything from Kalashnikovs to BRDMs.268 The 
end result of this diversification in activities was an extremely wealthy network of 
Chechen criminal groups, who were connected to equally influential bureaucrats and 
businessmen.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Modern Chechen organized crime is neither new nor unprecedented.  It developed 
from the merger of historic experiences and the introduction to an existing Russian 
organized crime structure.  Faced with competition between empires and the subsequent 
set of dualities that the competition set in motion, Chechens play the only role they were 
equipped to play, that of the intractable rebel.  This role of rebel ingratiated them into the 
Soviet criminal world.  Soviet policies and continued demonization further solidified the 
Chechen identity as one existing outside of Soviet society, while at the same time 
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spreading its people far from the confines of the North Caucasus.  Later generations of 
Chechens would exploit this dispersion.  Furthermore, the conditions within the Soviet 
police state and command economy provided the Chechens with connections and a niche 
in society.  It was a decidedly criminal niche but allowed Chechen criminal groups to 
amass connections, power and wealth.  These connections and services were in critical 
demand during the emerging Russian market system.  On the eve of Dudayev’s putsch 
the Chechen criminal elements were poised to support the effort for a Chechen bid for 
independence.   
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V. NOT-SO-STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE MERGER OF 
CHECHEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENT 
Dudayev’s leadership was excellent and his timing, the key behind any 
successful revolution, superb.  Yeltsin may not have been impressed but 
Trotsky and Stalin certainly would have been—not only by the 
revolution’s organization, but also by its fusion of politics and 
criminality.269 
Well before the first Russo-Chechen War, the stage had been set for the merger of 
a nascent government structure within Chechnya and various ethnic organized criminal 
elements.  It would be an arrangement that supported all parties in economic, political 
and security terms.  The burgeoning relationship was founded on more than just a simple 
rational calculation of cost and benefit, although this was a significant factor.  It grew out 
of a common understanding of ethnic identity and the myth of a pre-existing Chechen 
state.  Interestingly, a degree of similarity existed between nineteenth century Chechen 
attempts to establish a balance between subject and sovereign within the Russian Empire 
and the twentieth century attempts.270  However, in the late twentieth century economic 
preconditions were such that the outcome and the manner, by which the events unfolded, 
produced radically different results.   
Previous attempts at solidifying the Chechens into a formal government had been 
uniformly unsuccessful.  This trend would ultimately continue with the former Soviet Air 
Force general turned Chechen president, Djohar Dudayev’s attempt at Chechen 
independence.  However, there were significant similarities between Dudayev and 
previous Chechen leaders.  Dudayev would have to seize power in a political system 
comprised of Moscow puppets and fractious warlords.  In order to secure his position 
Dudayev needed support to get the necessary support he would have to make a series of 
alliances with powerful Chechen elements, many of which were criminal.  As in the past, 
Dudayev would pit an organically derived form of Chechen government from one 
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imposed upon the Chechens from Moscow.  The eventual criminality of the Dudayev 
regime would be influenced by historical perceptions of Chechens, but more so by 
contemporary actions and alliances. 
Chechen criminality, or the perception of it, had steadily grown since the first 
Russo-Chechen contact.  Imperial authors painted the Chechens as an amalgamation of 
noble savages and cutthroat bandits.  This perception was continued through the Soviet 
time, and built upon by both continued Chechen resistance to control from Moscow and 
their ruthless conduct inside the GULAG.  As the Soviet Union settled deeper into a 
morass of corruption, Chechen criminality was confirmed through their participation in 
the growing black and grey markets.  It was participation in these illegal economic 
sectors that facilitated the growth of a wealthy Chechen organized crime network. 
Chechen organized crime elements would play a critical role in the attempt to 
form an independent Chechen state during the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In previous 
attempts at state formation, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was no 
equivalent to an international, wealthy organized crime element.  While criminal groups 
were not the sole reason for Chechen military victories over the Russian Army, the 
weapons and support they provided did assist.   
Criminal elements were able to amass the amount of influence they had because 
of economic and political connections cemented during the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
Chechen crime elements had spread throughout the former Soviet Union and beyond.  In 
the process of expansion they had developed connections to some of the most powerful 
economic and political figures in the new Russian Federation.  Through these 
connections the Chechens criminals were able to build upon an already substantial 
amount of wealth.  Extreme wealth, robust logistics and international connections were 
all capabilities that any independent regime in Chechnya needed.    
The rise of Dudayev and the corresponding rise of Chechen criminal elements 
created a situation in which all parties could benefit.  It was this perceived symbiotic 
relationship that drew powerful Chechen criminals to support Dudayev’s bid for 
independence.  Some of the attraction to Dudayev may have been associated with his 
 83 
inflammatory rhetoric and the lack of Moscow ties. However, from the criminal 
standpoint the possibility of a safe haven, the potential to launder illegal revenues and the 
possibility of new criminal enterprises outweighed ethnic solidarity and hatred of 
Moscow.  This flexible calculation of cost and benefits would produce a fickle alliance, 
with criminals supporting the politician who could best further their interests. 
A. CRIME AND STATE: A THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT 
Crime is a phenomenon that is deeply tied to the society from which it originates.  
It has roots in the society’s concept of what construes acceptable behavior.  These 
perceptions are in turn derived from environmental and social conditions.  Acts 
considered criminal in one part of the world may not necessarily be perceived as criminal 
in another region that does not share common environmental, moral, and social factors.  
Criminologists have been struggling with the origins and manifestations of criminality 
since the inception of criminology as a scientific discipline.  Throughout the twentieth 
century criminology has been working on the link between crime, society and 
governmental forces and gradually taking a more holistic view of the phenomenon.271  
In examining the crime-state nexus in Chechnya, crime needs to be viewed from 
several perspectives.  First, crime is an organic social process meaning that it is directly 
tied to the society that defines it.272  In the case of Chechnya there are two competing 
societies, the local Chechen community and the larger Russian society.  The dual 
communities are a byproduct of the extended Russo-Chechen relationship.  As much, the 
Chechens have wanted independence they have been welded to the Russian community 
over the past 200 years, and will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future.   
Second, there is essentially no economic distinction between political corruption 
and organized crime, both served to promote their own interests normally working 
together to do so.  Organized criminals contribute to the campaigns of favorable 
politicians with the expectation of reciprocation.  Corrupted politicians for their part 
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ensure favorable regulatory conditions exist to further organized crime’s activities.273  At 
the heart of the relationship is a mutually beneficial arrangement, one that is subject to 
revaluation and change by either side if the cost-benefit equation becomes out of balance. 
The mutually beneficial and reinforcing relationship described above needed a 
beginning.  A successful state-maker needed the support of competent and successful 
criminals who would in turn need the support of an entrenched politician.  In Chechnya, 
it can rapidly become a chicken and egg argument, except for the unique social and 
economic environment present during the fall of the Soviet Union.  In this specific case, 
it was the powerful criminal elements that provided the necessary catalyst to start the 
cycle.  From this point onward, the reciprocal relationship held sway.  As criminal 
elements grew more successful, they required increased protection from corrupted 
government officials.274  In the relationship that developed money was the prime 
motivator for both politicians and criminals.  
Third, outside of an economic construct state-making relies heavily upon 
coercion, specifically, the monopoly upon the legitimate use of violence.  Inherent to this 
concept are two aspects, the capacity to monopolize violence and a perception of 
legitimacy from within and without the designated territory.  Charles Tilly drew an 
analogy between the consolidation of a state and an organized crime protection racket as 
an explanation of state formation in Western Europe.  The analogy can be taken more 
literally in the case of Chechnya.  Where in Europe it was the military that provided the 
muscle, in Chechnya it was organized criminal elements skilled in the operations of 
protection rackets that provided the muscle.275  
Tilly developed his theoretical structure to explain the process of state 
consolidation in Western Europe and warns against applying it directly to situations in 
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the contemporary “Third World.”  It is true that the social and economic conditions in 
Chechnya of the 1980s and 1990s differed significantly from that of sixteenth century 
Europe.  However, there are some important parallels that remain germane to our 
discussion, in Chechnya during the 1980s and 1990s like in sixteenth century Europe 
there was a contest over control of a territory, its people and resources.  In both situations 
the conflict was played out largely through the use of armed elements in an effort to 
subdue rivals and cow the population.  In both there were instances were armed elements 
became integral to the developing political process.276 
Tilly offers two general paths by which the monopoly on violence is achieved by 
a state.  The first way is through the establishment of a powerful military, one that is 
capable of subduing and then disarming rival militaries.  This construct is roughly a 
center-out process.  Alternatively, a political leader who is militarily weaker can opt to 
ally with an armed element.  Often times these armed elements are outlaws, as with the 
Robin Hood myth. Over an extended period of time this alliance becomes formalized and 
the outlaws are recast as integral elements of the government.277  The second route 
becomes essentially a periphery-in process.  
Chechnya represents a contemporary example of both paths.  Moscow attempted 
to undertake both the center-out process through the use of the military, while attempting 
a periphery-in process through negotiations with armed elements, Dudayev and his 
supporters.  Dudayev attempted the periphery-in process by allying with armed criminal 
and tribal groups. The process of integration in Tilly’s second option occurs over 
generations.  In Chechnya the processes occurred in the extended cases over several years 
and in some cased over the course of several months.   
It was the manner of incorporation of criminal elements in to the Chechen 
Republics structures that is most significant.  The integration of criminal elements and 
bureaucrats occurred within the framework of an “Iron Triangle.”278  In essence, the 
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“Iron Triangle” depicts the relationship between three prominent groups that emerged 
during the final years of the Soviet Union: businessmen, bureaucrats, and organized 
criminals.  Each group stood to gain a significant amount of wealth and thereby power in 
the emerging capitalist system.  Aside from a perversion of a free market model, major 
problems arose as the lines between the groups began to blur.  In many cases, the 
distinction eroded completely until all three groups were embodied into a single entity or 
group.  This was to be the fate of Chechnya; criminal elements worked themselves into 
positions of authority and used those positions to further their own interests.279   
B. KEY PLAYERS IN THE STATE-CRIMINAL-BUSINESS NEXUS 
The thread linking the analytical theories together is a rational assessment of costs 
and benefits by the key participants.  It is impossible to get into the heads of the various 
members involved in Dudayev’s bid for independence so we will likely never know the 
true motives behind their actions.  Criminals are not generally given to writing memoires 
and rebel leaders tend not to write much either.  Lacking detailed autobiographies, we are 
left with a theoretical framework of a rational actor and several instances that support the 
profit-maximizing viewpoint of Chechen criminals and politicians. 
How did Dudayev, a relative unknown in Chechnya, build significant political 
and military support to seize control of the republic?  At the core of this question’s 
answer is the first indicator towards a symbiotic relationship between crime and politics, 
corruptibility.  Born in 1944, Dudayev was a product of the Chechen deportation.  He 
spent most of his childhood in Kazakhstan before returning to the Chechen homeland, 
reportedly to a house filled with strangers.280  Entering into the military Dudayev took 
advantage of Soviet affirmative action efforts being one of the few Chechens ever to 
reach a senior military rank.281  He served with distinction in the Soviet military 
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achieving recognition as both a pilot and a garrison commander.  It was his final 
assignment that brought him into personal contact with both revolution and the leaders of 
Russia.282  
Dudayev seemed to have several qualities appealing to a nationalistic Chechen 
constituency.  He had first hand experience with a successful bid for national 
independence owing to his experience in Estonia.  Dudayev was a general in the Soviet 
Air Force, no small feat.  Achieving this position would seem to imply that Dudayev was 
intelligence and politically savvy.  Finally, he was thought to have a high degree of 
organizational skill derived from his 30-year career in the military.283 
All of the aforementioned criteria would certainly put Dudayev on solid ground as 
a revolutionary Chechen leader.  But there were likely additional factors that the 
nationalistic All-National Congress of Chechen Peoples (OKChN) thought were 
significant.  Before expanding upon the less obvious considerations it is necessary to 
characterize the OKChN.  This body was composed of “a coalition of Chechnya’s tiny 
middle class and intelligentsia, Chechen businessmen and Moscow’s Chechen 
community.”284  Its purpose was ostensibly to unify Chechen nationals and provide a 
nucleus for an independent Chechen government.  Under this charter, the OKChN agreed 
upon a ‘declaration of Chechen sovereignty’ independent of Moscow’s control.285  
OKChN’s policies were guided by its three most influential members, two were 
prominent businessmen one in Moscow and one in Chechnya, and the third would later 
be placed on UN Security Council’s blacklist of al-Qaeda related suspects.286   
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When looking at the composition of OKChN the fact that a majority of the 
members were businessmen is significant.  Of all the groups of individuals comprising 
post-Soviet society businessmen were the most likely to come into sustained contact with 
members of organized crime groups.  In many cases, the businessmen and criminals were 
one and the same.287  As mentioned previously, integral to the conduct of business in 
Russia was the establishment of a ‘roof’, the uniquely Russian term for racketeering.  Of 
the nearly 1,000 members present at OKChN inaugural meeting most would have had 
some connection to organized crime groups if they were not active members of crime 
groups.288   
What was it that attracted a group of nascent businessmen and possible criminals 
to a Soviet Air Force general?  Aside from possessing the perceived organizational skills 
and military credentials previously mentioned, Dudayev bore a striking similarity to the 
infamous Imam Shamil.  These similarities were enhanced by his inflammatory anti-
Russian rhetoric and references to Chechens rebellious past and the Chechens shared 
tribulations.  While the Russian hatred and images of the past were strong emotional 
motivators there may have been other more practical reasons for Dudayev’s selection.  
He was perceived as a lesser threat when compared to other aspiring leaders in Chechnya, 
mainly because of his lack of connection to the republic.  He had spent nearly his entire 
adult life in the Soviet military and therefore did not have an extensive network of 
supporters within the republic.  The lack of popular support networks within Chechnya 
would presumably force Dudayev to rely upon OKChN members.  Additionally, his 
family’s origins could be traced back to a small and politically insignificant clan,  
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preventing an independent familial powerbase.  From the standpoint of the OKChN 
leadership these factors taken together pointed to someone who could be manipulated and 
then controlled.289 
To one extent this perception was correct; Dudayev needed political, economic 
and military support to establish his authority.  In this, he was forced to rely upon 
prominent members of OKChN many of which had dubious backgrounds.  Yaragi 
Mamodayev, a prominent member of the petroleum and construction sector became 
Dudayev’s chief financial supporter.290  Beslan Gantemirov, a convicted criminal and 
paramilitary (in this instance brigand would be as appropriate of a term) leader formed 
the core of Dudayev’s National Guard.291  The National Guard would provide the muscle 
by which Dudayev could eliminate competing political factions consolidating his power 
within Chechnya.  Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev, a Chechen poet who would become 
Chechnya’s second president and later be linked to al-Qaeda, along with Yusup 
Soslambekov, a Moscow Chechen businessman, would serve to rally popular support for 
Dudayev inside and outside of Chechnya.292  All four members, with the possible 
exception of Yanderbiyev, were in positions that would almost certainly have linked 
them to Chechen organized crime elements, linkages that were not severed when they 
moved into prominent positions in the government. 
C. CRIME AND GOVERNMENT IN CHECHNYA: SYMBIOSIS  
Members of OKChN provided political, military and economic support needed by 
Dudayev.   In terms of political support, Dudayev needed to be seen inside and outside of 
Chechnya as a popular leader.  For the most part this was accomplished in the wake of 
the August, 1991 coup attempt in Moscow.  In response to the abortive Russian coup, 
OKChN leaders organized demonstrations in Grozny calling for the dissolution of the 
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Chechen Supreme Soviet and for power to be transferred to the OKChN executive 
council.293  The crowds were loud and visible and seemed to be a public representation of 
popular support for Dudayev.  However, many of the participants were reportedly 
motivated by money not revolutionary spirit.  Protesters were reportedly paid for their 
attendance, and to sweeten the deal livestock was ‘constantly being prepared.’294  There 
are few greater incentives for a rent-a-mob then a paycheck and a hot meal.  Funding the 
protesters was beyond the financial capabilities of a former Soviet general, the money 
must have originated from OKChN members who in turn likely acquired it through 
questionable activities.  It is reasonable to conclude that the initial investment in money 
was in anticipation of more significant future returns. 
Beyond financing popular demonstration the linkage to criminal elements became 
more tangible.  Dudayev needed muscle to capitalize on his perceived popular support.  
This came in the form of the National Guard, Gantermirov’s paramilitary group.  The 
National Guard was critical in the second of Chechnya’ putsches.  They fought other 
Chechen factions and seized key facilities throughout the republic. After several months 
of struggles between Dudayev and initially the pro-Russian Zavgayev and then the 
independent Khasbulatov the National Guard seized the Chechen ‘power ministries’ 
(KGB and MVD) as well as Chechen television and radio stations.  National Guard 
forces managed to maintain control of these facilities allowing Dudayev to call for 
Chechen elections, which he won.  These acts were not uniformly seen as extensions of 
the Chechen population’s desire for independence.  In a comment that is strikingly 
reminiscent of Yermolov, General Rutskoi called the coup an act of brigandage placing 
the fate of Chechnya’s 300,000 inhabitants in the hands of 300 desperate, highly armed 
criminals.295 
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For Dudayev’s National Guard to be effective it needed a constant supply of 
weapons and ammunition.  This was another area where Chechen organized crime 
provided support to the government.  As the Soviet Union began to collapse, Chechen 
organized crime groups were cornering the market on the illegal arms trade, as many of 
the sources of illegal weapons originating in the Caucasus.  Throughout the Soviet Union, 
illegal weapon sales were a significant source of money for criminals and military 
officials.296  A significant portion of the weapons in circulation during the 80s and 90s 
originated from the Trans-Caucasus Military District.  According to Moscow police 
organized crime squad, every week nearly 10,000 illegal weapons were flowing through 
Grozny into the rest of the country.297  It is unknown how many weapons systems were 
simply diverted to pro-Dudayev militias.  It was not simply small arms that were stolen, 
in 1993 it was assessed that ‘the number of artillery systems stolen from the Trans-
Caucasus Military District depots amounted four times the number of stored British army 
artillery.’298  The trade in arms continued through the first Chechen war, Thomas Goltz 
noted that during a 1995 trip to Grozny a senior Chechen governmental official boasted 
“that one could buy anything ‘from a stiletto to a Stinger missile’ in the local weapons 
bazaar.”299 
Weapons and protesters were not the only support criminal elements provided 
Dudayev.  Resulting from a combination of professional exodus and mismanagement the 
Chechen economy fell steadily under Dudayev’s leadership.  To complicate the matter, 
Yeltsin initiated an economic embargo that was furthered by the closure of the Chechen-
Georgian border.  Dudayev was forced to turn increasingly to illegal economic activities 
and paved the way for a deepening of the “Iron Triangle” in Chechnya.300     
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Beginning with the consolidation of Dudayev’s power and the commensurate 
reaffirmation of independence, the territorial status of Chechnya was ill defined.  The 
region defaulted to a free-trade zone becoming an ideal medium for the growth of 
criminal entrepreneurs.301  Even during the embargo ‘the Grozny airport was receiving 
between 100–150 unsanctioned international flights per month.’302  Thomas Goltz 
recounted his personal experience on one such flight, noting the TU-154 that carried him 
into Grozny through the “quasi” blockade had been stripped of seats to provide space for 
Chechen “suitcase businessmen” returning from the Middle East.303  Two conclusions 
can be drawn from the continued volume of flights, first they were providing a service 
valuable beyond the borders of Chechnya and second the coordinators of the flights had 
patrons in Moscow.304 
Growing external economic arrangements allowed the Chechen criminal 
businessmen to provide Dudayev’s government a link to the international community.  
Chechen independence had never been recognized universally in the international arena 
as a result there was no possibility of establishing formal embassies abroad.  Chechen 
Diasporas and economic activities provided a ready workaround, one that was 
advantageous to both sides.  Chechen businessmen abroad benefitted from the favorable 
trade imbalance and a duty free import zone in Grozny.  The government was afforded 
the ability to reach beyond the borders of Chechnya and engage political and economic 
entities.  It was not always a win-win situation as was the case of the Ustinov brothers.  
Ruslan and Nazarbeg Ustinov had arrived in the United Kingdom under the 
ostensibly diplomatic mission of coordinating the printing of currency and passports for 
the Chechen Republic.305  Members of the government in Grozny confirmed the 
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Ustinov’s claim of being dispatched on a legitimate diplomatic mission.306  On face 
value, it would appear that there was some validity to the claim of legitimacy to their 
mission.  Ruslan was one of Dudayev’s trusted advisors and in this capacity, he would 
seem appropriate for such a diplomatic mission.  However, Nazarbeg seems an odd 
choice for an economically focused diplomatic mission.  Nazarbeg “was a martial arts 
expert and general muscle-for-hire” with no visible economic skills.307    
It appears that there may have been a bit more to the Ustinov brother’s mission in 
London.  While they informed the British Foreign Office of their official purpose many 
additional indicators pointed to a different purpose.  The bothers had reportedly paid 
£999,000 in cash for a swank four-bedroom penthouse apartment, just doors from 
Sherlock Holmes’ old office.308  It is interesting how two individuals from a poor and 
conflict torn region of a falling empire could afford such a sizeable outlay of cash.  This 
was the first of several indicators that there was more to the Ustinov brothers that what 
they purported to the Foreign Office.   
A second indicator came from the bother’s extra-curricular activity and 
associates.  From their apartment on Bakers Street, the brothers undertook some very 
visible and non-diplomatic activities.  Wild parties were reportedly frequented by a 
‘stream’ of call girls seemed to be the normal fair for the brothers.  Aside from the 
prostitutes another individual in frequent attendance was a shady Armenian criminal, Ter-
Oganisyan.  Ter-Oganisyan was the husband of a BBC correspondent Ruslan Ustinov had 
met in Chechnya.309  He was involved in a series of unsuccessful criminal enterprises 
both within the UK and the Caucasus.  Ter-Oganisyan’s capability as a negotiator and 
fixer was the basis of his employment for the Ustinov brothers; however, the three 
became much closer over time.310 
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A third indicator of the brother’s supplementary missions resulted from the police 
investigation surrounding their deaths.  It seems that part of Ter-Oganisyan’s duties as 
negotiator and fixer extended beyond relations with the British government.  Ruslan had 
also been dispatched to negotiate for the sale of Chechen petroleum products on the 
world market and to secure a loan to modernize the oil industry’s infrastructure.  These 
missions appear to be beyond the skill sets of the three representatives.  When factoring 
in the individual the Chechens were reportedly negotiating with their skills may not be 
too far off the mark.  London newspapers identified their negotiation partner in the oil 
deal as an American with ties to organized crime.  In what capacity the American had 
connections to organized crime is unclear.  What is clearer is that the Chechens were also 
interested in arranging shipment of surface-to-air missiles.  The ultimate destination for 
the missiles remains in doubt, some say they were intended for the Chechen militias 
others that they were to be sold to Azeri fighters for their conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh.311   
It seems that the later perception was held by Ter-Oganisyan and may have lead 
to the deaths of Ruslan and Nazarbeg.  There was a falling out among the three 
individuals that left Ruslan with three holes in his head and stuffed in a wooden box.  
Nazarbeg was found shortly there after with similar wounds.  Execution style killings are 
not normally the way diplomatic missions end, provided that the diplomats are in fact 
doing their business with other diplomats.  However, if arrangements extend beyond the 
diplomatic circles into criminal ones then an ending such as the one the Ustinov brothers 
experienced becomes a distinct possibility.312   
The story of the brothers does not end there.  London police arrested Ter-
Oganisyan and an accomplice for the murders.  It appeared that forces in Grozny were 
unpleased with the prospects of British justice and dispatched their own judges.  An 
individual, presumed to be Chechen arrived Ter-Oganisyan’s wife’s sister-in-law’s house 
with the intention of murdering Ter-Oganisyan’s wife.  Fortunately for her she wasn’t 
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home, unfortunately his sister-in-law was home.  The assassin shot her multiple times in 
the head before he sped from the scene.  While there may be many explanations why the 
sister of a BBC reporter who was married to an Armenian implicated in the death of two 
Chechen diplomats was murdered in her London home, the most obvious was that the 
murder was ordered as retribution from Grozny, specifically Dudayev.313   
Such an explanation represented the deep symbiosis between the Dudayev 
government and organized crime elements.  Both entities benefitted from the arrangement 
and points to a more expansive pattern of actions.  Take for instance the diplomatic 
representatives Thomas Goltz ended up using to get into Chechnya during the first war.  
They were essentially extra-territorial ends of a smuggling chain.  Starting in Istanbul, 
with ‘official’ and unofficial representative Goltz manages arrange being smuggled into 
the republic along the same route that thousands of stolen cars had previously moved.314  
He was able to get in largely because the pattern had been established over the preceding 
half decade.    
Chechen criminal elements throughout the former Soviet Union had been able to 
move all manner of consumer goods to a willing market in Moscow at a significant mark-
up.  Moscow elites were able to take their cut of the profits and products as befitted a 
patron.  Similarly, Dudayev was able to reap financial and material benefits while 
flaunting Moscow’s embargo.  While the arrangement was mutually beneficial it was not 
equally beneficial.  Criminal entrepreneurs by far benefitted the most.  They were 
afforded a safe haven to move illicit goods through and because of scarcity could demand 
a higher price.  Because of their deepening position in republic’s government criminal 
elements were able to expand into new criminal enterprises, like fraud and money 
laundering. Dudayev managed to capture some profit these activities but at the cost of 
developing a long-term stable economy.  
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D. CRIME AND GOVERNMENT IN CHECHNYA: PARASITISM 
Chechen organized crime elements were integral in the initial formation of a 
Chechen independence movement through their involvement and influence with the 
OKChN and support to the Dudayev government.  These same elements subsequently 
migrated into positions of power within the government in some instances reducing the 
“Iron Triangle” to a single entity.  It was from positions within the government that 
criminals were able to expand their activities along new paths.  One such path involved 
the hijacking of state organs with the intention of embezzling funds or defrauding 
financial institutions. 
Until the early nineties Chechen criminal elements had acquired their wealth 
primarily through the sales of illegal merchandise, from weapons to drugs, or from 
established protection rackets.  With Dudayev’s declaration of independence, criminal 
elements in the government were able to expand into high dollar low risk fraud activities.  
Throughout the nineties the Russian banking system was subjected to many scams 
originating from the North Caucasus.  Because of a lack of a secure electronic backbone 
and an incomplete understanding of financial security Russian banks were particularly 
susceptible to fraud.315  
Large-scale bank fraud exploited the primitive nature of the Russian banking 
system.  Throughout Russia each bank was in essence an isolated financial node, there 
were no measures in place to securely transfer funds between institutions nor did a legal 
framework exist to regulate the industry.  To transfer funds between banks a system of 
avizo was employed.  The process consisted of a client presenting an avizo to commercial 
bank requesting the release of funds.  Commercial banks in turn would verify the 
presence of the funds with the regional payment center of the Russian Central Bank.  The 
Central bank would verify the presence of the funds at which time the commercial bank 
would then release the amount requested.  For the process to be circumvented officials at 
several levels would need to be complicit.  This was apparently the case since avizo fraud  
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was prevalent throughout Russia in the 1990s.  In Chechnya, organized crime elements 
utilized their positions within the government to conduct many such fraudulent 
activities.316 
An event commonly referred to as the ‘Chechen Affair’ neatly depicts the 
interconnection of Chechen organized crime and the Chechen government within the 
financial system.  A momentary lapse of dexterity thwarted what could have been the 
single most expansive bank robbery in the world.  A Moscow patrol car observed a group 
of men loading heavy sacks into a parked car.  One of the men tripped, dropping his sack 
and spilling wads of rubles.  The police quickly detained the men, all of Chechen origins 
and confiscated more than six million rubles most still in bank wrappings.317  
The men appeared unconcerned by the police attention, showing them promissory 
notes for additional amounts of money.  Many of the notes had been drawn from banks 
located in Grozny and the group had been intending on redeeming them at banks 
throughout Russia.  At the time of seizure, the notes roughly equated to seven hundred 
million dollars, an amount that would have brought the fledgling Russian banking system 
crashing down.  The notes were of course false, but the fact that they were drawn using 
official seals from Chechen and Russian banks was certainly suspect, indicating an ability 
to manipulate both Chechen and Russian politics to their advantage.318 
It is important to note that fraud such as the ‘Chechen Affair’ did not end with the 
capture of a network of criminals.  When the Grozny banks were contacted, they denied 
ever issuing avizos diverting further investigatory efforts.  Interestingly, shortly after the 
arrest of the criminals an investigator from the Chechen police appeared at the police 
department requesting the fraudulent avizos and departing within the evidence.  Moscow 
prosecutors attempted to contact the Chechen law enforcement agency but were informed 
that no investigator had been sent to Moscow.  Taken together, these events point to a 
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considerable effort to hide the extent of the fraud network, since it would likely have lead 
beyond the confines of the rebellious Chechen Republic.319 
To claim that the Chechens were the only or even the most significant force in 
defrauding the Russian banking system would be erroneous.  Non-Chechen actors were 
siphoning billions of dollars a year from the Russian banking system.  Not only were 
fraud schemes a way to make significant amounts of money, they were an ideal means to 
launder ill-gotten gains.  Funds would be quickly moved out of the country by criminal 
elements and deposited in liberal western banks, where the funds would be converted to 
dollars.  Criminals conducting the transfer would get a percentage of the profits, as would 
the bank officials who facilitated the fraud in the first place.  The prime motivator for the 
enterprise was money, when this motivation coincided with national independence both 
goals were advanced however when it clashed, it was money that won.  For Chechnya the 
conflict over competing priorities would play a role in the fragmentation of Dudayev’s 
independence movement.320 
E. CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
On the eve of the first Russo-Chechen War, the Chechen economy was in 
shambles.  The republic’s oil infrastructure was dilapidated and much of the profits and 
products were being funneled into the pockets of private individuals.  There are 
conflicting reports as to the extent of Dudayev’s involvement, but it is unrealistic to 
believe he was above suspicion.  In a 1993 conversation with Moscow Chechens, 
Dudayev reportedly claimed to have $70 million in foreign banks.321  Whether or not $70 
million was the figure Dudayev had in his accounts is immaterial, it is sufficient that the 
perception existed that he profited from the lawless situation in Chechnya.   
Anti-Dudayev factors were growing more powerful in the run-up to the first War.  
Umar Avturkhanov, the leader of an anti-Dudayev militia and political party, was 
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receiving financial and military support from Moscow.  He was reportedly close to the 
Chechen business community in Moscow, which would imply a similar connection to 
organized crime elements.  As most economic enterprises seek a degree of stability, the 
connection to Russia support would paint Avturkhanov in a more favorable light.  By 
assuming control of the republic, he may maintain the political and economic conditions 
in Chechnya that had allowed criminals to acquire their wealth to date.322   
Similarly, the self styled peacemaker and former Moscow favorite Ruslan 
Khasbulatov had made a tactical alliance with Ruslan Labazanov, the former Dudayev 
bodyguard and convicted criminal.  In repeating the motivations of the Dudayev-criminal 
alliance, the criminal-state alliance between Khasbulatov and Labazanov seems most 
obvious.  Khasbulatov needed a means of coercive force and Labazanov happened to 
possess such a capability.  In turn, Labazanov saw to further his own financial interests 
by exploiting the Chechen oil sector.323 
In both situations, it is possible to see the seeds of not only the military and 
political struggle for control of Chechnya but also the struggle for control of the criminal 
activities.  There were significant amounts of money to be made in a criminal but 
relatively stable Chechnya.  Criminal entrepreneurs who had missed out on the initial 
division of the Chechen market or those who simple wanted a bigger piece of the pie had 
incentives to risk supporting alternative candidates.  Dudayev was turning out to be more 
unpredictable than originally thought.  His erratic behavior was increasing the likelihood 
of a strong Russian response and was cutting into the profit margin of the organized 
crime elements.  Additionally, Dudayev’s ability to control Chechnya had essentially 
dissolved by the summer of 1994.324  From this perspective he was rapidly becoming a 
liability instead of an asset for those interested in exploiting a lawless but relatively stable 
Chechnya. 
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The fragmentation of power within Chechnya while not entirely dependent upon 
conflicting criminal goals was certainly aided by this competition.  The fragmentation 
provided an excuse for Moscow’s military intervention.  Realizing he lacked sufficient 
military power to oust Dudayev, Avturkhanov requested assistance from Moscow.325  
This opened the door for the eventual Russian military deployment for the first Russo-
Chechen war.  It would be false to say that the continuity of organized criminal 
enterprises was the sole reason for Russian military intervention.  There were many 
factors that contributed to Yeltsin’s decision to deploy forces in order to reestablish 
control over the region, but in light of the decidedly corrupt nature of both Chechen and 
Russian government and society, and the vast amounts of money to be made through 
Chechnya, criminality cannot be ruled out as a factor. 
Criminality continued to play a role throughout the two Russo-Chechen wars 
although the nature of the conflict affected the form of criminality.  The high profit-low 
risk activities associated with bank fraud disappeared with the first war.  So too did the 
majority of the luxury goods smuggling since the difficulty of transporting this type of 
merchandise did not justify the decreasing profit margin.   
Criminality did not give way to the struggle for independence, it was modified to 
adapt to the current environmental conditions.  Organized criminal elements changed 
their flavor and alliances but were still present inside and outside of Chechnya.  Oil theft 
still maintained a place in the economic portfolio of organized criminals but to a lesser 
extent then in the early nineties.  Figures of oil theft remained high well into the 1990s, 
the profits of which went to various militia/crime groups.326  Anna Politkovskaya noted 
that illegal theft of oil continued well into the second Russo-Chechen war with profits 
being shared between criminal elements and Russian official.327  The criminal acts 
continued with only a change in the organization providing the roof. 
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Narcotics trafficking continued throughout both conflicts and into the present.  
The amount of narcotics that flows through Chechnya comprises only a fraction of the 
total import volumes.  Yet its contribution to the black market profits of criminals cannot 
be discounted.  Chechen fighters such as Shamil Basayev, Movladi Udugov and Khattab 
were operating narcotics labs as a funding source.328  Unless these fighters were planning 
on selling the product to their own supporters a connection with a wider narcotics 
network was needed.  For this network to function there needed to be at least some 
protection by individuals in power.329  The networks extend throughout the Caucasus and 
Russia with Chechen organized criminal groups playing a continuing role.330 
Beyond narcotics, embezzlement continued through the two wars and beyond.  
Nearly $1 billion worth of funds to rebuild Chechnya after the first war simply 
disappeared.  This pattern continued during the interwar period, through the second war 
and into the current era.331  Corruption and embezzlement will not change anytime soon 
primarily because of the structure of the government and its relation to Moscow and need 
for stability.  Ramzan Kadyrov must balance the desires of Moscow with those of 
powerful local backers.  He has managed to continue a system of patronage established 
by his father where illegal activity is tolerated provided the government can filter a 
percentage of the profits and the total level does not exceed what is tolerable to Moscow. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Chechen organized Crime became a critical factor to the bid for Chechen 
independence during final years of the Soviet Union.  Its elements had managed to amass 
significant resources and connections both within inside Russia and beyond its borders.  
In an increasingly symbiotic manner political, business and criminal entities began to 
expand their activities from rudimentary protection and smuggling rackets to more 
sophisticated endeavors.  Chechen business and criminal leaders saw the break-up of the 
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Soviet Union as the perfect situation to increase their profit potential.  However, for this 
to occur Chechnya would need a leader who was malleable and sufficiently dependent 
upon the services only they could provide.  Dudayev was thought to be such a leader. 
Chechen criminals supported Dudayev’s bid for independence with economic, 
political and logistics support.  This support was critical to Dudayev’s initial push to 
consolidate power within Chechnya, but would lead to several unintended consequences.  
Criminal support was not free; in exchange for their support Chechen criminals expected 
positions within the Dudayev government.  From these government positions they would 
further both Dudayev’s agenda and their own leading to the eventual collapse of 
legitimate Chechen economic activity.  When the interests conflicted then those of the 
criminals won out, further compounding the economic and political situation in 
Chechnya.  Ultimately, a re-evaluation of the cost/benefit calculation led to the 
fragmentation of both criminal and political power on the eve of the first Russo-Chechen 
war.   
The crime state nexus continued to play a role in reformation of the Chechen state 
during and after the wars.  The criminal and government relationship has reached a state 
of equilibrium such that a degree of stability and profitability can be maintained.  Gone 
are the wild days of gangster capitalism to be replaced by a less profitable but more stable 
relationship, a condition that will likely remain for the foreseeable future.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When the name Chechnya is mentioned in conversation, it carries with it sanguine 
images. For many, the name evokes images of a series of bloody independence 
movements fought by bearded Islamic radicals.  To those who have dabbled in 
international business or criminal studies, Chechnya brings to mind the more nefarious 
image of purveyors of a particularly violent from of the modern Russian protection 
racket.  Images of Chechen organized crime are often connected with Chechen leaders or 
bureaucratic officials, particularly over the past several decades.  Drawing the connection 
between the Chechen official and criminal organizations is not without basis.  Chechen 
criminality has been an evolutionary process, one that has been influenced by internal and 
external factors over the past 200 years. 
Chechnya has never managed to become a true nation-state in the modern context.  
Through the decades, its political structure has ranged from egalitarian individualism to a 
highly centralized police state. All of these forms have been influenced by internal and 
external stimuli.  Centuries of relative isolation left the Chechens essentially unchanged. 
Early Chechen society was anarchic, comprised of small tribal communities who 
subsisted on a combination of agriculture and raiding.  In this environment independence 
was not only prized it was critical for survival.  It was this desire for independence that 
would define subsequent Chechen governments and eventually their identity. 
Prolonged interaction with foreign societies would produce the first radical 
change in the concept of a collective Checheness.  The nature of the contact with other 
societies produced the first changes in Chechen society.  Russian imperial expansion and 
rule had been shaped over centuries, adapting to the requirements needed to rule an ever-
expanding multi-ethnic state.  The Russians preferred to co-opt regional elites instead of 
direct rule.  A heavy use of military force was often employed to reinforce the co-option.  
Conquest of the Caucasus came at the end of Russian imperial expansion and was 
affected by an eclectic system of imperial practices, none of which fit the Chechen 
situation.  
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Simultaneous with the arrival of Russia was the slow spread of a more developed 
and expansive concept of Islam.  Islam had made gradual inroads into Chechnya owing to 
the general tendency to resist any outside force.  However, by the early nineteenth 
century it had permeated to a sufficient degree that it could be used as a unifying force.  
In addition to an emotional call to arms Sufi Islam provided a structure for a supra-tribal 
government along with the concept of a greater community.  A linkage to a greater 
community was critical in the development of a grass-roots notion of a Chechen state, 
based on a common identity, and would place any such state in conflict with Russia and 
its artificial colonial structures. 
Like the development of a Chechen state, the construction of a criminalized 
Chechen identity is not the product of a single era.  The notion of criminality has grown 
throughout the course of interaction between the Russians and the Chechens.  It 
developed out of a combination of action and reaction on the part of both Russians and 
Chechens.  However, two events have served to crystallize the belief, Shamil’s resistance 
and the deportation.  Both events are used as touchstones by each side and provide a 
tangible, although subjective, explanation for Chechen criminality. Running through the 
Russo-Chechen relationship has been the growth of a Chechen mythology, focusing on 
resistance to authority, and participation in criminal or perceived criminal acts.  In the 
end the myth produced a belief, both inside and outside of Russia, of the existence of a 
criminal ethnicity as well as a violent and expansive Chechen Mafia.  While there are 
elements of truth to the notion of Chechen criminality, its pervasiveness was uniformly 
exaggerated.  Not all Chechens were criminals in the strictest sense.  Although it would 
be equally false to ignore the role of the perception of Chechen criminality in the 
formation of an actual Chechen organized crime element.  This uniquely Chechen 
criminal element would eventually provided significant support in the formation of a 
Chechen government. 
Modern Chechen organized crime is neither new nor unprecedented.  It sprung 
from the merger of historic experiences and the exposure to an established Russian 
criminal world.  Faced with competition between empires and the subsequent set of 
dualities that the competition set in motion, Chechens play the only role they were 
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equipped to play, that of the intractable rebel.  This role of rebel ingratiated them into the 
Soviet criminal world.  Soviet policies and continued demonization further solidified the 
Chechen identity as one existing outside of Soviet society, while at the same time 
spreading its people throughout the new empire.  Later generations of Chechens would 
exploit this dispersion with criminal intent.  Furthermore, the conditions within the Soviet 
police state and command economy provided the Chechens with connections and a niche 
in society.  It was a decidedly criminal niche, but one that allowed Chechen criminal 
groups to amass connections, power and wealth.  These connections and resources were 
in critical demand during the emerging Russian market system.  On the eve of Dudayev’s 
putsch the Chechen criminal elements were poised to support the effort for a Chechen bid 
for independence.   
Chechen organized crime became a critical factor in the bid for Chechen 
independence during final years of the Soviet Union.  Its elements had managed to amass 
significant resources and connections both within Russia and beyond its borders.  In an 
increasingly symbiotic manner political, business and criminal entities began to expand 
their activities from rudimentary protection and smuggling rackets to more sophisticated 
endeavors.  Chechen business and criminal leaders saw the break-up of the Soviet Union 
as a perfect situation to increase the potential profit of their organizations.  However, for 
this to occur Chechnya would need a leader who was malleable and sufficiently 
dependent upon the services only they could provide.  For many, Dudayev was thought to 
be such a leader. 
Chechen criminals supported Dudayev’s bid for independence with economic, 
political and logistics support.  This support was key to Dudayev’s initial push to 
consolidate power within Chechnya but would lead to several unintended consequences.  
Criminal support was not free; in exchange for their support Chechen criminals expected 
positions within the new Chechen government.  From these positions the criminals 
furthered both Dudayev’s agenda and their own leading to the eventual collapse of 
legitimate Chechen economic activity.  When the interests conflicted, as would be the 
case, then the interests of the criminals won out, further compounding the economic and 
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political situation in Chechnya.  Ultimately, a re-evaluation of the cost/benefit calculation 
led to the fragmentation of both criminal and political power on the eve of the first 
Russo-Chechen war.   
The crime state nexus continued to play a role in reformation of the Chechen state 
during and after the wars.  The criminal and government relationship has reached a state 
of equilibrium under Ramzan Kadyrov, such that stability and profitability can be 
balanced.  Organized criminals were critical during the push for Chechen independence 
immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union.  The provided necessary resources 
and capabilities without which the nascent government would have immediately failed. 
Criminals remain integrated in the government and will likely remain there for the 
foreseeable future.  Gone are the wild days of gangster capitalism to be replaced by a less 
profitable but more stable relationship.  
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